# Open Source Round 4

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### The war power authority of the president is activated by Congressional authorization- that’s key to set a limit on what the term means

Bejesky 2013 [Robert Bejesky M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law ¶ (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the ¶ Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, American government and ¶ constitutional law courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University ¶ and the University of Miami. 1/23/2013 “WAR POWERS PURSUANT TO FALSE PERCEPTIONS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN THE “ZONE OF TWILIGHT”” St Mary’s Law Journal http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/Bejesky\_Step12.pdf]

Congressional war powers include the prerogatives to “declare War;” ¶ “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” which were operations that fell ¶ short of “war”; “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the ¶ land and naval Forces;” “to provide for organizing, arming, and ¶ disciplining, the Militia;” “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and ¶ Water;” “raise and support Armies;” and “provide and maintain a ¶ Navy.”¶ 46¶ Alternatively, the President is endowed with one war power, ¶ that of “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.”¶ 47¶ Numerical ¶ comparison indicates that the intended dominant branch in war powers ¶ decisions is Congress. The Commander in Chief authority is a core preclusive power that ¶ designates the President as the head of the military command chain once ¶ Congress activates the power.¶ 48¶ Moreover, peripheral Commander in ¶ Chief powers are bridled by both statutory and treaty restrictions.¶ 49¶ The ¶ media lore of using “Commander in Chief” coterminous with “President” ¶ might occasionally be a misnomer outside of war, perhaps abetting ¶ presidential expansionism when combined with commentators employing ¶ terms such as “inherent authority.” Clearly, if Congress has not activated ¶ war powers, the President still possesses inherent authority to react ¶ expeditiously and unilaterally to defend the nation when confronted with ¶ imminent peril.¶ 50¶ However, the Framers drew a precise distinction when ¶ they specifically empowered the President “to repel and not to commence ¶ war.”¶ 51¶ Alexander Hamilton explained that latitude was required “because ¶ it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national ¶ exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which ¶ may be necessary to satisfy them.”¶ 52

### They’re a limit on the president’s ongoing conflict, not his war powers authority

### Prefer this interp based on limits- presidents assert they have the authority to do almost anything- they have huge institutional incentives to continue that trend- the negative cannot be expected to have a case neg to every assertion the OLC has ever made about what authority the president has

### Statutes limit presidential authority

Neil Kinkopf, Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law, 2005, “The Statutory Commander in Chief,” Indiana Law Journal, Fall, pp. LN.

This symposium asks us to consider the scope and limits of presidential power in the context of war and terrorism. This question strongly suggests a constitutional focus. [n1](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1365110483507&returnToKey=20_T17087561416&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.113675.46701765596" \l "n1) Because the Constitution establishes the presidential office and sets forth its powers and duties, it is the appropriate starting point for considering this question. The Constitution alone, however, does not get us very far. A wide range of statutes bear on the President's power in this realm and serve to define the extent and limits of his power. As a practical matter, then, the question of presidential power in the context of war and terrorism is one of statutory interpretation. Recognizing the centrality of statutory interpretation in this crucial area, a number of scholars have turned their attention to this question. From their writings, a consensus appears to be emerging on some important foundational points. First, these scholars claim that the President is entitled to deference. Second, where assertions of presidential power implicate individual constitutional rights, these scholars claim that the President's assertion must be founded on a statute that includes a clear statement of authority.

### “Judicial restrictions” is a limiting interpretation of executive war powers

Singer 7 (Jana, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, SYMPOSIUM A HAMDAN QUARTET: FOUR ESSAYS ON ASPECTS OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: HAMDAN AS AN ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER, Maryland Law Review 2007 66 Md. L. Rev. 759)

n25. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance of courts "to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs"); see also Katyal, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that "in war powers cases, the passive virtues operate at their height to defer adjudication, sometimes even indefinitely"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1313-17 (1988) (discussing the Court's use of justiciability doctrines to refuse to hear challenges to the President's authority in cases involving foreign affairs); Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court's Noninterference with the Guardians of National Security, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1122, 1124-38 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's general policy of nonintervention in cases concerning actions of governmental agencies and political entities in national security matters); Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 433-34 (1989) (discussing the use of the political question doctrine as a means to avoid judicial restrictions on presidential power in cases involving military force).

### They are effectively a self-restraint, not an external statutory or judicial restriction

### Bidirectionality- allowing self-restraint affs allows actual increases in executive action in topical areas-steals a key neg generic CP—not a decrease in his war powers authority, can easily defend an increase as a result--it’s just NOT the topic

### A limited topic of discussion is key to equitable ground—even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable—this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

## 1NC

### Critiquing American empire is dangerous whining. Embracing decreases hegemony

Kagan 1998– PhD, graduate of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, adjunct history professor at Georgetown, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, Foreign Policy, “The benevolent empire”)
Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did during the Cold War, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget — even if most of the rest of the world does not — just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling.

### **Neoliberalism liberates more than it destroys and spreading Western ideals decreases structural violence**

Kors, Professor of History at University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2001 (Alan Charles, “Triumph without Self-Belief,” Orbis, Summer, ebsco

For generations, and to this day, the great defenders of the humane consequences of the allocation of capital by free markets--Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman, for example--have remained unexplored, marginalized, or dismissed as absurd by most American intellectuals. The lionized intellectuals were and are, in sentimental memory, those who dreamed about and debated how one would make the transition from unproductive and unjust capitalism to the cornucopia of central planning. For a full generation, academic intellectual culture above all generally viewed the West's anticommunist military strength, let alone its willingness to project that strength, as the great obstacle to international justice and peace, and derided the doctrine of peace through strength as the slogan of the demented. For at least a generation, Western intellectual contempt for the West as a civilization, a set of ideals, and the object of hope for the potentials of humanity has been the curriculum of the humanities and "soft" social sciences. Given these ineffably sad phenomena, the seeming triumph of the West (both the collapse of neo-Marxist theory at universities outside the West, and especially the downfall of the Soviet empire) will be understood by Western intellectuals as showing, in the latter case, how absurd Western fears were from the start, and, in both cases, not so much a victory for the West as merely the economic collapse of communists who in various ways betrayed their ideals or failed to temper them with adequate pragmatism or relativism. One must recall, however, the years 1975-76 in the world of the intellectual Left: the joy at American defeat in Indochina; the excitement over Eurocommunism; the anticipation of one, ten, a hundred Vietnams; the contempt for Jean-Francois Revel's The Totalitarian Temptation; the ubiquitous theories of moral equivalence; the thrill Of hammers and sickles in Portugal; the justifications of the movement of Cuban troops into those great hopes for mankind, Angola and Mozambique; the loathing of all efforts to preserve Western strategic superiority or even parity. One must recall, indeed, the early 1980s: the romanticization of the kleptomaniacal and antidemocratic Castroite Sandinistas and the homicidal megalomaniac Mengistu of Ethiopia; the demonization of Reagan's foreign policy; the outrage when Susan Sontag declared the audience of Reader's Digest better informed than readers of The Nation about the history of the USSR; the mockery of the president's description of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and of communism as a vision that would end on "the dustbin of history"; and the academic associations that approved politically correct resolutions for a nuclear freeze. The latter included the American Historical Association, which voted in overwhelming numbers to inform the American government and public that, as professional historians, they knew that Reagan's rearmament program and deployment of missiles in Europe would lead to a severe worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations, end the possibilities of peace, and culminate in an exchange of weapons in an ineluctable conflict. All of that will be rewritten, forgotten, indirectly justified, and incorporated into a world view that still portrays the West as empire and the rest of the world as victim. The initial appeal of communism and romanticized Third World leaders--Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, Sekou Toure, and Daniel Ortega--who would redefine human well-being and productivity (well, they certainly redefined something) reflected the Western pathology whereby intellectuals delude themselves systematically about the non-West, about that "Other" standing against and apart from the society that does not appreciate those intellectuals' moral and practical authority and status. However, when an enemy arose that truly hated Western intellectuals--namely, fascism--and whose defeat depended upon the West's self-belief, Western intellectuals quickly became masters of judgments of absolute superiority and had no difficulty in defining a contest between good and evil. Cognitive dissonance is an astonishing phenomenon, and in academic circles, it prevents three essential historical truths from being told. First, the most murderous regime in all of human history, the Bolsheviks in power, has fallen: its agents were guilty of irredeemable crimes against humanity, and its apologists should do penance for the remainder of their lives. Anticommunists within the law were warriors for human freedom; communists and anti-anticommunists, whatever their intentions, were warriors for human misery and slavery. The most that can be said in communism's favor is that it was capable of building, by means of. slave labor and terror, a simulacrum of Gary, Indiana, once only, without ongoing maintenance, and minus the good stuff. Secondly, voluntary exchange among individuals held morally responsible under the rule of law has demonstrably created the means of both prosperity and diverse social options. Such a model has been a precondition of individuation and freedom, whereas regimes of central planning have created poverty, and (as Hayek foresaw) ineluctable developments toward totalitarianism and the worst abuses of power. Dynamic free-market societies, grounded in rights-based individualism, have altered the entire human conception of freedom and dignity for formerly marginalized groups. The entire "socialist experiment," by contrast, ended in stasis, ethnic hatreds, the absence of even the minimal preconditions of economic, social, and political renewal, and categorical contempt for both individuation and minority rights., Thirdly, the willingness to contain communism, to fight its expansion overtly and covertly, to sacrifice wealth and often lives against its heinous efforts at extension--in Europe, Vietnam, Central Asia, Central America, Korea, Laos, Cambodia, and, indeed, Grenada--was, with the struggle against Nazism over a much briefer period, the great gift of American taxpayers and the American people to planet earth. As Britain under Churchill was "the West" in 1940, so was the United States from 1945 to 1989, drawing from its values to stand against what was simultaneously its mutant offspring and its antithesis. In the twentieth century, the West met and survived its greatest trial. On the whole, howeverWestern intellectuals do not revel in these triumphs, to say the least. Where is the celebration? Just as important, where is the accounting? On the Left, to have either would be to implicate one's own thought and will in the largest crime and folly in the history of mankind. We have seen myriad documentaries on the collective and individual suffering of the victims of Nazism, but where is the Shoah, or the Night and Fog, let alone the Nuremberg trails of the postcommunist present? As Solzhenitsyn predicted repeatedly in The Gulag Archipelago, the countless victims who froze to death or were maimed in the Arctic death camps would go unremembered; the officers and guards who broke their bodies and often their souls would live out their lives on pensions, unmolested; and those who gave the orders would die peacefully and unpunished. Our documentary makers and moral intellectuals do not let us forget any victim of the Holocaust. We hunt down ninety-year-old guards so that the bones of the dead might have justice, and properly so. The bones of Lenin's and Stalin's and Brezhnev's camps cry out for justice, as do the bones of North Vietnam's exterminations, and those of Poi Pot's millions, and Mao's tens of millions. In those cases, however, the same intellectuals cry out against--what is their phrase?--"witch-hunts," and ask us to let the past be the past. We celebrated the millennium with jubilation; we have not yet celebrated the triumph of the West. Ask American high school or even college students to number Hitler's victims and Columbus's victims, and they will answer, for both, in the tens of millions. Ask them to number Stalin's victims and, if my experience is typical, they will answer in the thousands. Such is their education, even now. The absence of celebration, of teaching the lessons learned, and of demands for accountability is perhaps easily understood on the Left. Convinced that the West above all has been the source of artificial relationships of dominance and subservience, the commodification of human life, and ecocide, leftist intellectuals have little interest in objectively analyzing the manifest data about societies of voluntary exchange, or in coming to terms with the slowly and newly released data about the conditions of life and death under the Bolsheviks and their heirs, or in confirming or refuting various theories on the outcome of the Cold War (let alone, given their contemporary concerns, in analyzing ecological or gender politics under communist or Third World regimes). Less obvious, but equally striking in some ways, has been the absence of celebration on so much of the intellectual Right, because it is not at all certain something worth calling Western civilization did in fact survive the twentieth century.

### Aff’s abandonment of imperialism causes global proliferation and nuclear war

Stephen Peter Rosen (PhD from Harvard University in 1979 and is currently the Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs in the Department of Government, Harvard University) Spring 2003 “An Empire, If you Can Keep It,” The National Interest, , LN Academic, UK: Fisher

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, **the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia**. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But **those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and**, in the most probable post-imperial world, **would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker** than they are today. **Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East**. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. **If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive**.

### US military is crucial to every impact

Kagan, 11 (The Price of Power The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs Jan 24, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 18 • By ROBERT KAGAN Robert Kagan is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.)

Today the international situation is also one of high risk. • The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons. • In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. In the present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless. Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its “fair share” of the pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when one considers the nature of the cuts that would have to be made to have even a marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many are under the illusion, for instance, that if the United States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didn’t intervene anywhere else for a while, this would have a significant impact on future deficits. But, in fact, projections of future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these -interventions. Withdrawal from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal crisis. Nor can meaningful reductions be achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagon—which Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun to do and which has also been factored into deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cut all the waste Gates can find, and even eliminated a few weapons programs—all this together would still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending. In fact, the only way to get significant savings from the defense budget—and by “significant,” we are still talking about a tiny fraction of the cuts needed to bring down future deficits—is to cut force structure: fewer troops on the ground; fewer airplanes in the skies; fewer ships in the water; fewer soldiers, pilots, and sailors to feed and clothe and provide benefits for. To cut the size of the force, however, requires reducing or eliminating the missions those forces have been performing. Of course, there are any number of think tank experts who insist U.S. forces can be cut by a quarter or third or even by half and still perform those missions. But this is snake oil. Over the past two decades, the force has already been cut by a third. Yet no administration has reduced the missions that the larger force structures of the past were designed to meet. To fulfill existing security commitments, to remain the § Marked 18:36 § “world’s power balancer of choice,” as Leslie Gelb puts it, to act as “the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East” requires at least the current force structure, and almost certainly more than current force levels. Those who recommend doing the same with less are only proposing a policy of insufficiency, where the United States makes commitments it cannot meet except at high risk of failure. The only way to find substantial savings in the defense budget, therefore, is to change American strategy fundamentally. The Simpson-Bowles commission suggests as much, by calling for a reexamination of America’s “21st century role,” although it doesn’t begin to define what that new role might be. Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible,¶ that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.

### **The alternative is to vote negative to align yourself with American hegemony.**

### **The only tangible threat to US primacy is isolationism – rhetoric of support is critical to preserving international stability**

William Kristol and Robert Kagan 1996 (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=276 - Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy - Robert Kagan is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dangerous Nation: America’s Place in the World from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the 20th Century, (Knopf 2006) was the winner of the 2008 Lepgold Prize and a 2007 Finalist for the Lionel Gelber Prize. He is listed as one of the world’s “Top 100 Public Intellectuals” Kagan is an expert in U.S. national security and foreign policy, U.S. relations with Russia, China and Europe, the European Union, NATO expansion, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Iraq. B.A., Yale University; M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Ph.D., American University)

TWENTY YEARS later, it is time once again to challenge an indifferent America and a confused American conservatism. **Today's lukewarm consensus about America's reduced role in a post-Cold War world is wrong.** Conservatives should not accede to it; it is bad for the country and, incidentally, bad for conservatism. Conservatives will not be able to govern America over the long term if they fail to offer a more elevated vision of America's international role. What should that role be? Benevolent global hegemony. Having defeated the "evil empire," the United States enjoys strategic and ideological predominance. **The first objective of U.S. foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America's security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world**. The aspiration to benevolent **hegemony might strike some as** either hubristic or **morally suspect. But a hegemon is nothing more or less than a leader with preponderant influence and authority over all others in its domain**. That is America's position in the world today. The leaders of Russia and China understand this. At their April summit meeting, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin joined in denouncing "hegemonism" in the post-Cold War world. They meant this as a complaint about the United States. It should be taken as a compliment and a guide to action. Consider the events of just the past six months, a period that few observers would consider remarkable for its drama on the world stage. **In East Asia, the carrier task forces of the U.S. Seventh Fleet helped deter Chinese aggression against democratic Taiwan, and the 35,000 American troops stationed in South Korea helped deter a possible invasion by the rulers in Pyongyang. In Europe, the United States sent 20,000 ground troops to implement a peace agreement in the former Yugoslavia, maintained 100,000 in Western Europe as a symbolic commitment to European stability and security, and intervened diplomatically to prevent the escalation of a conflict between Greece and Turkey. In the Middle East, the United States maintained the deployment of thousands of soldiers and a strong naval presence in the Persian Gulf region to deter possible aggression by Saddam Hussein's Iraq or the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Iran, and it mediated in the conflict between Israel and Syria in Lebanon. In the Western Hemisphere, the United States completed the withdrawal of 15,000 soldiers after restoring a semblance of democratic government in Haiti and, almost without public notice, prevented a military coup in Paraguay. In Africa, a U.S. expeditionary force rescued Americans and others trapped in the Liberian civil conflict**. These were just the most visible American actions of the past six months, and just those of a military or diplomatic nature. During the same period, the United States made a thousand decisions in international economic forums, both as a government and as an amalgam of large corporations and individual entrepreneurs, that shaped the lives and fortunes of billions around the globe. **America influenced both the external and internal behavior of other countries through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Through the United Nations, it maintained sanctions on rogue states such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq. § Marked 18:37 § Through aid programs, the United States tried to shore up friendly democratic regimes in developing nations.** **The** enormous **web of the global economic system, with the United States at the center, combined with the pervasive influence of American ideas and culture, allowed Americans to wield influence in many other ways of which they were entirely unconscious.** The simple truth of this era was stated last year by a Serb leader trying to explain Slobodan Milosevic's decision to finally seek rapprochement with Washington. "As a pragmatist," the Serbian politician said, "Milosevic knows that **all satellites of the United States are in a better position than those that are not satellites."** And America's **allies are in a better position than those who are not its allies. Most of the world's major powers welcome U.S. global involvement and prefer America's benevolent hegemony to the alternatives**. Instead of having to compete for dominant global influence with many other powers, therefore, the United States finds both the Europeans and the Japanese -- after the United States, the two most powerful forces in the world -- supportive of its world leadership role. Those who anticipated the dissolution of these alliances once the common threat of the Soviet Union disappeared have been proved wrong. The principal concern of America's allies these days is not that it will be too dominant but that it will withdraw. Somehow most **Americans** have failed to notice that they have never had it so good. They have never **live**d in **a world more conducive to their fundamental interests in a liberal international order, the spread of freedom and democratic governance, an international economic system of free-market capitalism and free trade, and the security of Americans not only to live within their own borders but to travel and do business safely and without encumbrance almost anywhere in the world**. Americans have taken these remarkable benefits of the post-Cold War era for granted, partly because it has all seemed so easy. **Despite** misguided **warnings of imperial overstretch, the United States has so far exercised its hegemony without any noticeable strain,** and it has done so despite the fact that Americans appear to be in a more insular mood than at any time since before the Second World War. The events of the last six months have excited no particular interest among Americans and, indeed, seem to have been regarded with the same routine indifference as breathing and eating. And that is the problem. The most difficult thing to preserve is that which does not appear to need preserving. The dominant strategic and ideological position the United States now enjoys is the product of foreign policies and defense strategies that are no longer being pursued. Americans have come to take the fruits of their hegemonic power for granted. During the Cold War, the strategies of deterrence and containment worked so well in checking the ambitions of America's adversaries that many American liberals denied that our adversaries had ambitions or even, for that matter, that America had adversaries. Today the lack of a visible threat to U.S. vital interests or to world peace has tempted Americans to absentmindedly dismantle the material and spiritual foundations on which their national well-being has been based. They do not notice that **potential challengers are deterred before even contemplating confrontation by their overwhelming power and influence**. The ubiquitous post-Cold War question -- where is the threat? -- is thus misconceived. In a world in which **peace and American security depend on American power and the will to use it, the main threat the United States faces now and in the future is its own weakness**. **American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as possible**. To achieve this goal, the United States needs a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence.

## Case

### Neoliberalism is a bad frame for political analysis

Worstall 10 [Tim, “More on this neo-liberalism thing”, Adam Smith Institute, March 7]

**Neo-liberalism gets blamed for a lot of things**: that bankers couldn't see a housing bubble for **example. It's also been said that the insistence that the poor countries of the world do the same things to get rich that we did to get rich** - trade, get governments out of the way, try to create wealth, these sorts of things - **was neo-liberalism conspiring to keep them poor**. As we all know**, China moved marketwards from a near insane communism and has been growing explosively since. India moved marketwards from a near insane Fabianism and has been growing explosively since**....but what about Africa? It would be fair to say that this neo-liberalism thing got there a little later. Mid 1990s sounds about right, so, how's it been [working](http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/papers/pdfs/Africa_Paper_VX3.2.pdf)? **The conventional wisdom that Africa is not reducing poverty is wrong**..... **we estimate income distributions**, poverty rates, **and inequality and welfare indices for African countries for the period** 1970‐2006. We show that: **African poverty is falling and is falling rapidly. .... The growth spurt that began in 1995 decreased African income inequality instead of increasing it.  African poverty reduction is remarkably general: it cannot be explained by a large country**, or even by a single set of countries possessing some beneficial geographical or historical characteristic. All classes of countries, including those with disadvantageous geography and history, experience reductions in poverty. In particular, **poverty fell for both landlocked as well as coastal countries; for mineral**‐**rich as well as mineral**‐**poor countries;** for countries with favorable or with unfavorable agriculture; for countries regardless of colonial origin; and for countries with below‐ or above median slave exports per capita during the African slave trade. How amazing: our melanin enhanced brethren are indeed our brethren, they react to and take advantage of economic incentives just as we do**. Allowed the freedom to create, innovate and create wealth, wealth they create.** Whatever ordure dumped upon them from that great height in the past by near insane economic policies and the thugs and crooks that have ruled them, peace, easy taxes and the tolerable administration of justice have been doing their thing. Or as those desiring that near a billion people escape poverty and join us in enjoying the fruits of the bourgeois lifestyle should perhaps be saying, neo-liberalism is dead: **long live neo-liberalism**.

### Prefer our studies—our authors use a testable empirical method

Weede, 04 – professor of sociology at the University of Bonn, Germany, In Winter 1986-87, he was Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Bologna Center of The Johns Hopkins University. (Erich, “BALANCE OF POWER, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE CAPITALIST PEACE,” http://www.fnf.org.ph/downloadables/Balance%20of%20Power,%20Globalization%20and%20Capitalist%20Peace.pdf)

If one does research or summarize the research of others – of course, most of the ideas, theories, and evidence discussed below have been produced by others – one cannot avoid some epistemological commitments. In the social sciences the fundamental choice is whether to pursue an ideographic or a nomothetic approach. Almost all historians choose the ideographic approach and focus on the description of structures or events, whereas most economists and psychologists choose the nomothetic approach and focus on the search for law-like general statements. Sociologists and political scientists are still divided – sometimes even by the Atlantic Ocean. In American political science the nomothetic approach dominates the flagship journal of the profession, the American Political Science Review, as well as more specialized journals, such as International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, or World Politics. In German political science, however, the nomothetic approach has advanced little beyond electoral studies. My own approach is definitely nomothetic. This is related to my training in psychology at one of the first German universities focusing on quantitative research methods in the early 1960s, the University of Hamburg. This epistemological orientation has been reinforced by graduate training in international politics at one of the first American universities emphasizing quantitative research in the late 1960s, Northwestern University, which is located in a suburb of Chicago. Nomothetic research focuses on hypothesizing, testing and establishing law-like general statements or nomological propositions. Examples of such propositions are: The higher average incomes in a nation are, the more likely is democratic government. Or, the more economic freedom in a nation prevails, the less frequently it is involved in war. One characteristic of such propositions is that they say something about observable reality. Whenever you say something about reality, you risk that others find out that you are wrong. If we observed that most poor countries were democracies, but most rich countries were autocracies, then we should reject or, at least, modify the proposition about prosperity and democracy mentioned above.1 Nomothetic researchers look for refutations. They try to falsify their propositions or theories (Popper 1934/1959). If the empirical evidence is compatible with one's theory, then one keeps the hypothetical propositions and regards them as supported – until negative evidence turns up. Although certitude about possession of the truth is beyond the capabilities of human inquiry, growth of knowledge is conceivable by the successive elimination of errors. This epistemological approach borrowed from Popper were easily applicable, if most of our propositions were deterministic, if they claimed to be valid without exceptions. Then, finding a single exception to a general statement – say, about prosperity and democracy – would suffice to falsify the proposition. Looking at poor India nevertheless being democratic, or at fairly rich Kuwait nevertheless being autocratic, would suffice to reject the theory.2 Unfortunately, almost no theory in macroeconomics, macrosociology, or international relations delivers deterministic propositions. Instead we have only probabilistic statements of the type that more prosperous countries are more likely to be democratic than others, or that economically freer countries are more likely to avoid war involvement than others. Probabilistic assertions never can be falsified by pointing to single events which do not fit with theoretical expectations. Instead we have to look at relative frequencies, at correlations or regression coefficients. We need statistical tools to evaluate such propositions. We typically ask the question whether a hypothesized relationship is so strong that it could only rarely occur because of random measurement or sampling error. Probabilistic propositions are regarded as supported only if they jump certain thresholds of significance which are ultimately defined by mere conventions. Researchers are interested in causal propositions, that is, in statements about causes and effects, or determinants and consequences. Such statements can be used for explanation, forecasting, or policy interventions. We need to know more than the mere existence of some association or correlation between, say, prosperity and democracy, or economic freedom and the avoidance of military conflict. We need to know whether prosperity promotes democracy, or whether democracy promotes growth, or whether, possibly, both statements might be defensible or, for the time being, taken for 'true'. While a correlation between two variables, like prosperity and democracy, is equally compatible with the simple alternative causal propositions that prosperity causes democracy, and that democracy causes prosperity, this ambiguity no longer necessarily applies in more complex theoretical models. There, we tend to explain a single effect by a number of causes. For example, one may contend that democracy is promoted by prosperity as well as by a capitalist economic order (or economic freedom). We can take such a theoretical contention – which may be true or false, compatible with the data or not – as a starting point for specifying a regression equation.3 If both theoretical statements – about the democratizing effects of prosperity and capitalism – were true, then the regression coefficients of both variables should be positive and significant. If this is what we find in empirical research, then we regard the two propositions as provisionally supported. But final proofs remain impossible in empirical research. It is conceivable that some nonbeliever in the two propositions suggests a third measurable determinant of democracy. Before it actually is included in the regression equation, one never knows what its inclusion results in. Possibly, the previously significant and positive regression coefficients of prosperity and capitalism might be reduced to insignificance or even change signs. Then a previously supported causal proposition would have to be overturned and rejected. The claim of causality implies more than observable association or correlation. It also implies temporal precedence of causes before effects. If one wants to test the causal proposition that prosperity contributes to democratic government, or that economic freedom contributes to the avoidance of military conflict, then one should measure prosperity or economic freedom before their hypothesized effects occur – certainly not later. If there is doubt about the direction of causality, as there frequently is, one might also look at the relationships between, say, earlier prosperity and later democracy as well as between earlier democracy and later prosperity. Although such investigations may become technically complicated, it might suffice here to keep the general principles in mind. From causal propositions we derive expectations about correlation or regression coefficients. But conclusions from correlations to causal propositions are not justified. One simply can never 'verify' causal statements by correlations. From causal propositions we also derive expectations about temporal precedence. As long as empirical evidence fits one's theoretical expectations, one regards the propositions or theory as provisionally supported and works with them. There is another complication. As illustrated by the debate about the effects of trade and economic interdependence on the avoidance of military conflict below, full accordance of empirical studies and verdicts with theories is the exception rather than the rule – if it ever happens at all. That is why some philosophers of science (for example, Kuhn 1962; Lakatos 1968-69) have been critical of the idea of falsification and warned against premature rejection of propositions. If 'anomalies' or 'falsification' are more or less ubiquitous, then our task is no longer so easy as to choose between theories which have been falsified and therefore deserve rejection and those which are compatible with the facts and therefore deserve to be accepted until negative evidence turns up. Then our task becomes to choose between competing theories, for example about the conflict reinforcing or pacifying impact of trade, and to pick those which fit the data relatively better than others. So, the claim advanced in this review of the literature cannot be that the empirical evidence fits the capitalist peace idea perfectly, but merely that the evidence fits it much better than competing explanations of military conflict and notions about the negative impact of capitalism on the avoidance of conflict and war or the irrelevance of democracy do. The epistemological discussion above could provide no more than a crude 'feel' for empirical research in the social sciences and its pitfalls. Although certitude is beyond reach, it is better to rely on testable, tested and so far supported propositions than on a hodgepodge of ambiguous hunches, contradictory thinking, and unsystematically evaluated empirical evidence.

### Tech solves the terminal impact

Huggins 2012 (Laura E. Huggins, research fellow at the Hoover Institution and director of development at PERC—the Property and Environment Research Center—a think tank in Bozeman, Montana, that focuses on market solutions to environmental problems, 2012 “A Doom Deferred” http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/105756)

The **authors** of the Times op-ed also **wrote that “the effects of overpopulation play a part in practically every daily report of mass human calamity**.” Floods, for example, “inundate more homes as populations expand into floodplains. Such extreme events are stoked by climate change, fueled by increasing carbon emissions from an expanding global population.” **These modern-day predictions are in stark contrast to claims in the same vein from the 1970s**. In a popular 1970 speech at Swarthmore College, for example, well-known ecologist Kenneth Watt said, “If present trends continue, the world will be about four degrees colder for the global mean temperature in 1990, but 11 degrees colder in the year 2000. This is about twice what it would take to put us into an ice age.” **Time has not been gentle with such prophecies. Four decades later, the world hasn’t come to an end**. Most measures of human welfare show **the Earth’s population is better off today than at any other time in human history. Life expectancy is increasing, per-capita income is rising, and the air we breathe and the water we drink are cleaner**. And concerns about climate change have shifted from cooling to warming since the 1970s. Given past trends, **we are right to deny doom-and-gloom claims** such as this one in Harte and Ehrlich’s article: “Perpetual growth is the creed of a cancer cell, not a sustainable human society.” New ideas and technologies proliferate at a much faster rate than population. **New ideas and technologies proliferate at a much faster rate than population**. They depend on individuals who are free to pursue their own interests and innovate with few constraints. As Stanford economist Paul Romer put it, “**Every generation has perceived the limits to growth that finite resources and undesirable side effects would pose if no new recipes or ideas were discovered. And every generation has underestimated the potential for finding new recipes and ideas. We consistently fail to grasp how many ideas remain to be discovered. Possibilities do not add up; they multiply.”**

### **Neoliberalism is key to free trade**

Anwar Shaikh, professor at the New School. “The economic mythology of neoliberalism,” Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader, Alfredo Saad-Filho (ed.) Pluto Press, London, February, 2004. <http://homepage.newschool.edu/~AShaikh/neoliberalism.pdf>

The defenders of neoliberalism have a ready response to this charge. Truly competitive conditions did not hold in the past, they say, so the past is not a useful guide. However, **with the help of international institutions, competition can be spread throughout the globe. And when it is, free trade will work as promised. It is therefore essential to eliminate restrictions on markets, particularly in the developing world** (Bhagwati 2002, Lecture 1). **This is the central conclusion of neoliberalism**.

### **Free markets solve your offense**

Stephen Moore, President, Club for Growth, “Surer Way to Sustain the Planet,” THE WASHINGTON TIMES, August 30, 2002, p. A21.

What has been the **driving force behind this** miraculous **progress**. Three words: **free market capitalism**. If only the intellectual elite and the power-holders around the world in South Africa this week would go home and deregulate their economies, cut tax rates, expand democracy, and cut government rules and bureaucracies, we could blaze a path to alleviating world poverty in a generation or two. If only markets, not governments, controlled the price and usage of natural resources, we would see a further abundance of food, minerals and energy - enough for the entire world to share in the bounty. The U.N. Earth Summit is based on a cancerous and discredited creed of limits to growth. It is insane to hope that people who believe in limits to growth will create the conditions that nurture growth. Even the term "sustainable development" is offensive and suggests that economic development and improving the environment are somehow incompatible - which is precisely the opposite of the historical record. **Where there is economic development and capitalism, there is clean air and clean water and well-educated citizens and abundant resources** and low disease rates. **Where there is no capitalism, there is an abundance of** these **maladies**.

### **Alt would cause the starvation of billions**

Democratic Socialist Party, “Chapter II: Symptoms and Causes of the Environmental Crisis,” ENVIRONMENT, CAPITALISM, AND SOCIALISM, online edition, 2004. Available from the World Wide Web at: www.dsp.org.au/dsp/ECS/html

The power and environmental impact of modern technology is so intense and wide-ranging that its shortsighted application to nature can have, and is having, catastrophic results. This has led some environmentalists to urge the abandonment of industrial technology and a return to a pre-industrial, self-sufficient, agrarian, village-based economy as the only way to preserve the natural equilibrium of the biosphere. Such a proposal is not only reactionary in the most literal sense of the term, but also totally untenable. Firstly, it would mean the death, through starvation alone, of much of the world's current population. Modern industrialised agriculture produces cereal crop yields of 6000-8000 kilograms per hectare. Using such industrial farming techniques, each hectare of cultivated land can support 25-35 people at the minimum level of 230 kilograms per capita. Non-industrial farming techniques produce only enough to support about one person per hectare. Using currently cultivated land, pre-industrial methods of cereal production would be sufficient to provide the minimum daily calorie requirements for about 1400 million people, that is, less than one-third of the world's present population. Indeed, prior to industrialisation, the world's population reached a maximum of 600 million, one-eighth its present number.

### Aff fails- Human nature

Barnhizer 2006 (David Barnhizer, Professor of Law at Ohio State University, Articles Editor of the Ohio State Law Journal and then served as a Reginald Heber Smith Community Lawyer Fellow in Colorado Springs Legal Services Office, a Ford Urban Law Fellow, and a Clinical Teaching Fellow at the Harvard Law School, Senior Advisor to the International Program of the Natural Resources Defense Council, a Senior Fellow for Earth Summit Watch, and General Counsel for the Shrimp Tribunal. He has served as Executive Director of The Year 2000 Committee, 2006 “waking from sustainability’s “impossible dream”” Georgetown environmental law review)

Devotees of sustainability pin their hopes **on an awakening by an enlightened populace that will rise up and insist that business and government behave in ways that reflect the idea that "[a] sustaina**ble society is one that can persist over generations, one that is far-seeing enough, flexible enough, and wise enough not to undermine either its physical or its social systems of support."81 This awakening **is not going to happen.** There will **never** be **a populist revolution in the way** humans value the environment, social justice, and other matters of moral consequence. **We** frequently "**talk the talk," but rarely "walk the walk."**82 This discrepancy is partly an individual failure, but it is even more a result of the powerful forces that operate within our culture. Residents of Western cultures are shaped by the system in which they live. They will **never possess either the clarity of agenda or the political will essential to a coherent and coordinated shift in behavior due to a combination of ignorance, greed, sloth, and inundation by political and consumerist propaganda**. This combination means **there will be no values shift welling up from the people and demanding the transformation of our systems of production and resource use.**

### Sustainability is impossible and causes extinction in the short term—-expansion of free markets is key

Barnhizer 6 — Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. (David, Waking from Sustainability’s "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government, 18 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 595, Lexis)

Medieval alchemists sought unsuccessfully to discover the process that would enable them to turn base metal into gold--assigning the name "Philosopher's Stone" to what they sought. The quest was doomed to failure. Just as a "sow's ear" cannot become a "silk purse," a base metal cannot become gold. Sustainability is impossible for the same reasons. It asks us to be something we are not, both individually and as a political and economic community. It is impossible to convert humans into the wise, selfless, and nearly omniscient creatures required to build and operate a system that incorporates sustainability. Even if it were ultimately possible (and it is not), it would take many generations to achieve and we are running out of time.¶ There is an enormous gap among what we claim we want to do, what we actually want to do, and our ability to achieve our professed goals. I admit to an absolute distrust of cheap and **easy proclamations of lofty ideals** and commitments to voluntary or unenforceable codes of practice. The only thing that counts is the actor's actual behavior. For most people, that behavior is shaped by self-interest determined by the opportunity to benefit or to avoid harm. In the economic arena this means that if a substantial return can be had without a high risk of significant negative consequences, the decision will be made to seek the benefit. It is the reinvention of Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. n1¶ This essay explores the nature of human decisionmaking and motivation within critical systems. These systems include business and governmental decisionmaking with a focus on environmental and social areas of emerging crisis where the consequence of acting unwisely or failing to act wisely produces large-scale harms for both human and natural systems. The analysis begins by suggesting that nothing humans create is "sustainable." Change is inevitable and [\*597] irresistible whether styled as systemic entropy, Joseph Schumpeter's idea of a regenerative "creative destruction," or Nikolai Kondratieff's "waves" of economic and social transformation. n2¶ Business entities and governmental decisionmakers play critical roles in both causing environmental and social harms and avoiding those consequences. Some have thought that the path to avoiding harm and achieving positive benefits is to develop codes of practice that by their language promise that decisionmakers will behave in ways consistent with the principles that have come to be referred to as "sustainability." That belief is a delusion--an "impossible dream." Daniel Boorstin once asked: "Have we been doomed to make our dreams into illusions?" n3 He adds: "An illusion . . . is an image we have mistaken for reality. . . . [W]e cannot see it is not fact." n4 Albert Camus warns of the inevitability of failing to achieve unrealistic goals and the need to become more aware of the limited extent of our power to effect fundamental change. He urges that we concentrate on devising realistic strategies and behaviors that allow us to be effective in our actions. n5¶ As companies are expected to implement global codes of conduct such as the U.N. Global Compact and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, n6 and governments [\*598] and multilateral institutions supposedly become more concerned about limiting the environmental and social impacts of business decisionmaking, it may be useful to consider actual behavior related to corporate and governmental responses to codes of practice, treaties, and even national laws. Unfortunately, business, government, and multilateral institutions have poor track records vis-a-vis conformity to such codes of practice and treaties.¶ Despite good intentions, empty dreams and platitudes may be counterproductive. This essay argues that the ideal of sustainability as introduced in the 1987 report of the Brundtland Commission and institutionalized in the form of Agenda 21 at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit is false and counterproductive. The ideal of sustainability assumes that we are almost god-like, capable of perceiving, integrating, monitoring, organizing, and controlling our world. These assumptions create an "impossible" character to the "dream" of sustainability in business and governmental decisionmaking.¶ Sustainability of the Agenda 21 kind is a utopian vision that is the enemy of the possible and the good. The problem is that while on paper we can always sketch elegant solutions that appear to have the ability to achieve a desired utopia, such solutions work "if only" everyone will come together and behave in the way laid out in the "blueprint." n7 Humans should have learned from such grand misperceptions as the French Enlightenment's failure to accurately comprehend the quality and limits of human nature or Marxism's flawed view of altruistic human motivation that the "if only" is an impossibly utopian reordering of human nature we will never achieve. n8¶ [\*599] A critical defect in the idea of sustainable development is that it continues the flawed assumptions about human nature and motivation that provided the foundational premises of Marxist collectivism and centralized planning authorities. n9 Such perspectives inject rigidity and bureaucracy into a system that requires monitoring, flexibility, adaptation, and accountability. But, in criticizing the failed Marxist-Leninist form of organization, my argument should not be seen as a defense of supposed free market capitalism. Like Marxism, a true free market capitalism does not really exist.¶ The factors of greed and self interest, limited human capacity, inordinate systemic complexity, and the power of large-scale driving forces beyond our ability to control lead to the unsustainability of human systems. Human self-interest is an **insurmountable barrier** that can be affected to a degree only by effective laws, the promise of significant financial or career returns, or fear of consequences. **The only way to change** the behavior of **business** and governmental decisionmakers **is through the** use of the "**carrot**" and the "stick." n10 Yet even this approach can only be achieved incrementally with limited positive effects.

### Neolib Solves War

Hillebrand 2010 Evan E. Hillebrand (Professor of Diplomacy at University of Kentucky and a Senior Economist for the Central Intelligence Agency) 2010 “Deglobalization Scenarios: Who Wins? Who Loses?” Global Economy Journal, Volume 10, Issue 2 2010

A long line of writers from Cruce (1623) to Kant (1797) to Angell (1907) to Gartzke (2003) have theorized that economic interdependence can lower the likelihood of war. Cruce thought that free trade enriched a society in general and so made people more peaceable; Kant thought that trade shifted political power away from the more warlike aristocracy, and Angell thought that economic interdependence shifted cost/benefit calculations in a peace-promoting direction. Gartzke contends that trade relations enhance transparency among nations and thus help avoid bargaining miscalculations. There has also been **a tremendous amount of empirical research** that mostly **supports** the idea of **an inverse relationship between trade and war**. Jack Levy said that, “While there are extensive debates over the proper research designs for investigating this question, and **while** someempirical **studies find** that **trade is associated with** international **conflict,** moststudies **conclude that trade is associated with peace**, both at the dyadic and systemic levels” (Levy, 2003, p. 127). There is another important line of theoretical and empirical work called Power Transition Theory that focuses on the relative power of states and warns that when rising powers approach the power level of their regional or global leader the chances of war increase (Tammen, Lemke, et al, 2000). Jacek Kugler (2006) warns that the rising power of China relative to the United States greatly increases the chances of great power war some time in the next few decades. The IFs model combines the theoretical and empirical work of the peacethrough trade tradition with the work of the power transition scholars in an attempt to forecast the probability of interstate war. Hughes (2004) explains how he, after consulting with scholars in both camps, particularly Edward Mansfield and Douglas Lemke, estimated the starting probabilities for each dyad based on the historical record, and then forecast future probabilities for dyadic militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars based on the calibrated relationships he derived from the empirical literature. **The probability of a** MID, much less a **war**, between any random dyad **in any given year is very low,** if not zero. Paraguay and Tanzania, for example, have never fought and are very unlikely to do so. But there have been thousands of MIDs in the past and hundreds of wars and many of the 16,653 dyads have nonzero probabilities. In 2005 **the** mean **probability of a country being involved in** at least one **war was** estimated to be 0.8%, with 104 countries having a probability of at least 1 war approaching zero. A dozen countries12, however, have initial probabilities over 3%. model predicts four great power wars in the deglobalization scenario vs. 2 in the globalization scenario.16 The globalization scenario projects that **the probability for war will gradually decrease through 2035 for every country**—but not every dyad--that had a significant (greater than 0.5% chance of war) in 2005 (Table 6). The decline in prospects for war stems from the scenario’s projections of rising levels of democracy, rising incomes, and rising trade interdependence—all of these factors figure in the algorithm that calculates the probabilities. Not all dyadic war probabilities decrease, however, because of the power transition mechanism that is also included in the IFs model. The probability for war between China and the US, for example rises as China’s power13 rises gradually toward the US level but in these calculations the probability of a China/US war never gets very high.14 **Deglobalization raises the risks of war substantially**. In a world with much lower average incomes, less democracy, and less trade interdependence, the average probability of a country having at least one war in 2035 rises from 0.6% in the globalization scenario to 3.7% in the deglobalization scenario. Among the top-20 war-prone countries, the average probability rises from 3.9% in the globalization scenario to 7.1% in the deglobalization scenario. The model estimates that in the deglobalization scenario there will be about 10 wars in 2035, vs. only 2 in the globalization scenario15. Over the whole period, 2005-2035, the IV. Winners and Losers Deglobalization in the form of reduced trade interdependence, reduced capital flows, and reduced migration has few positive effects, based on this analysis with the International Futures Model. Economic growth is cut in all but a handful of countries, and is cut more in the non-OECD countries than in the OECD countries. Deglobalization has a mixed impact on equality. In many non-OECD countries, the cut in imports from the rest of the world increases the share of manufacturing and in 61 countries raises the share of income going to the poor. But since average productivity goes down in almost all countries, this gain in equality comes at the expense of reduced incomes and increased poverty in almost all countries. The only winners are a small number of countries that were small and poor and not well integrated in the global economy to begin with—and the gains from deglobalization even for them are very small. Politically, deglobalization makes for less stable domestic politics and a greater likelihood of war. The likelihood of state failure through internal war, projected to diminish through 2035 with increasing globalization, rises in the deglobalization scenario particularly among the non-OECD democracies. Similarly, **deglobalization makes for more fractious relations among states and the probability for** interstate **war rises**.

### **Neoliberalism not oppressive or exploitive – empirically proven**

Bhagvati 4 (University Professor at Columbia University and Senior Fellow in International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations [JagdishBhagwati, “In Defense of Globalization”. 2004. Overview, http://www.cfr.org/publication/6769/in\_defense\_of\_globalization.html]

Jagdish Bhagwati takes conventional wisdom—that globalization is the cause of several social ills—and turns it on its head. **Properly regulated, globalization, he says, is the most powerful force for social good in the world.** Drawing on his unparalleled knowledge of international economics, Bhagwati dismantles the antiglobalization case. He persuasively argues that **globalization often leads to greater general prosperity in an underdeveloped nation: it can reduce child labor, increase literacy, and enhance the economic and social standing of women.** And to § Marked 18:40 § counter charges that globalization leads to cultural hegemony, to a bland “McWorld,” Bhagwati points to several examples, from literature to movies, in which **globalization has led to a spicy hybrid of cultures**. Often controversial and always compelling, Bhagwati cuts through the noise on this most contentious issue, showing that globalization is part of the solution, not part of the problem. Anyone who wants to understand what’s at stake in the globalization wars will want to read *In Defense of Globalization*. The first edition of *In Defense of Globalization* addressed the critiques that concerned the social implications of economic globalization. **Thus, it addressed questions such as the impact on women’s rights and equality, child labor, poverty in the poor countries, democracy, mainstream and indigenous culture, and the environment**. Professor Bhagwati concluded that **globalization was, on balance, a force for advancing these agendas as well.** Thus, whereas the critics assumed that **globalization** lacked a human face, it **actually had a human face**. He also examined in depth the ways in which **policy and institutional design could further advance these social agendas, adding more glow to the human face.**

### Neolib isn’t the root cause of war

MacKenzie 3—prof of economics at Coast Guard Academy. Former prof of economics at Kean. BA in Economics and Management Science at Kean. MA in Economics from U Connecticut. PhD in economics from George mason (DW, “Does Capitalism Require War?,” 7 April 2003, <http://mises.org/story/1201>,)

Perhaps the oddest aspect of these various, but similar, claims is that their **proponents** appeal so often to historical examples. They often **claim** that **history shows how capitalism is imperialistic** and warlike or at least benefits from war. Capitalism supposedly needs a boost from some war spending from time to time, and history shows this. Robert **Higgs demonstrated** that the wartime **prosperity during the Second World War was illusory**[i]. This should come to no surprise to those who lived through the deprivations of wartime rationing. We do not need wars for prosperity, but does capitalism breed war and imperialism anyway? **History is rife with** examples of **imperialism**. The Romans, Alexander, and many others of the ancient world waged imperialistic wars. The Incan Empire and the empire of Ancient China stand as examples of the universal character of imperialism. **Who could possibly claim** that **imperialism grew out of the prosperity of these ancient civilizations**? **Imperialism precedes modern industrial capitalism by many centuries.** Uneven wealth distribution or underconsumption under **capitalism** **obviously did not cause these instances of imperialism**. Of course, this fact does not prove that modern capitalism lacks its own imperialistic tendencies. The notion that income gets underspent or maldistributed lies at the heart of most claims that capitalism either needs or produces imperialistic wars. As J.B. Say argued, supply creates its own demand through payments to factors of production. Demand Side economists Hobson and Keynes argued that there would be too little consumption and too little investment for continuous full employment. We save too much to have peace and prosperity. The difficulty we face is not in oversaving, but in underestimating the workings of markets and the desires of consumers. Doomsayers have been downplaying consumer demand for ages. As demand side economist J.K. Galbraith claimed, we live in an affluent society, where most private demands have been met. Of course, Hobson made the same claim much earlier. Earlier and stranger still, mercantilists claimed that 'wasteful acts' such as tea drinking, gathering at alehouses, taking snuff, and the wearing of ribbons were unnecessary luxuries that detracted from productive endeavors. The prognostications of esteemed opponents of capitalism have consistently failed to predict consumer demand. Today, consumers consume at levels that few long ago could have imagined possible. There is no reason to doubt that consumers will continue to press for ever higher levels of consumption. Though it is only a movie, Brewster's Millions illustrates how creative people can be at spending money. People who do actually inherit, win, or earn large sums of money have little trouble spending it. Indeed, wealthy individuals usually have more trouble holding on to their fortunes than in finding ways to spend them. We are never going to run out of ways to spend money. Many of the complaints about capitalism center on how people save too much. One should remember that there really is no such thing as saving. Consumers defer consumption to the future only. As economist Eugen Böhm-Bawerk demonstrated, people save according to time preference. Savings diverts resources into capital formation. This increases future production. Interest enhanced savings then can purchase these goods as some consumers cease to defer their consumption. Keynes' claim that animal spirits drive investment has no rational basis. Consumer preferences are the basis for investment. Investors forecast future consumer demand. Interest rates convey knowledge of these demands. The intertemporal coordination of production through capital markets and interest rates is not a simple matter. But Keynes' marginal propensities to save and Hobson's concentration of wealth arguments fail to account for the real determinants of production through time. Say's Law of Markets holds precisely because people always want a better life for themselves and those close to them. Falling interest rates deter saving and increase investment. Rising interest rates induce saving and deter investment. This simple logic of supply and demand derives from a quite basic notion of self interest. Keynes denied that the world worked this way. Instead, he claimed that bond holders hoard money outside of the banking system, investment periodically collapses from 'the dark forces of time and uncertainty, and consumers save income in a mechanical fashion according to marginal propensities to save. None of these propositions hold up to scrutiny, either deductive or empirical. Speculators do not hoard cash outside of banks. To do this means a loss of interest on assets. People do move assets from one part of the financial system to another. This does not cause deficient aggregate demand. Most money exists in the banking system, and is always available for lending. In fact, the advent of e-banking makes such a practice even less sensible. Why hoard cash when you can move money around with your computer? It is common knowledge that people save for homes, education, and other expensive items, not because they have some innate urge to squirrel some portion of their income away. This renders half of the market for credit rational. Investors do in fact calculate rates of return on investment. This is not a simple matter. Investment entails some speculation. Long term investment projects entail some uncertainty, but investors who want to actually reap profits will estimate the returns on investment using the best available data. Keynes feared that the dark forces of time and uncertainty could scare investors. This possibility, he thought, called for government intervention. However, government intervention (especially warfare) generally serves to increase uncertainty. Private markets have enough uncertainties without throwing politics into the fray. The vagaries of political intervention serve only to darken an already uncertain future. Capital markets are best left to capitalists. Nor is capital not extracted surplus value. It comes not from exploitation. It is simply a matter of people valuing their future wellbeing. Capitalists will hire workers up to the point where the discounted marginal product of their labor equals the wage rate. To do otherwise would mean a loss of potential profit. Since workers earn the marginal product of labor and capital derives from deferred consumption, Marxist arguments about reserve armies of the unemployed and surplus extraction fail. It is quite odd to worry about capitalists oversaving when many complain about how the savings rate in the U.S. is too low. Why does the U.S., as the world's 'greatest capitalist/imperialist power', attract so much foreign investment? Many Americans worry about America's international accounts. Fears about foreigners buying up America are unfounded, but not because this does not happen. America does have a relatively low national savings rate. It does attract much foreign investment, precisely because it has relatively secure property rights. Indeed, much of the third world suffers from too little investment. The claims of Marxists, and Hobson, directly contradict the historical record. Sound theory tells us that it should. The Marxist claim that capitalists must find investments overseas fails miserably. Larry Kudlow has put his own spin on the false connection between capitalism and war. We need the War as shock therapy to get the economy on its feet. Kudlow also endorses massive airline subsidies as a means of restoring economic prosperity. Kudlow and Krugman both endorse the alleged destructive creation of warfare and terrorism. Kudlow has rechristened the Broken Window fallacy the Broken Window principle. Kudlow claims that may lose money and wealth in one way, but we gain it back many time over when the rebuilding is done. Kudlow and Krugman have quite an affinity for deficits. Krugman sees debt as a sponge to absorb excess saving. Kudlow see debt as a short term nuisance that we can dispel by maximizing growth. One would think that such famous economists would realize that competition does work to achieve the goal of optimum growth based on time preference, but this is not the case. While these economists have expressed their belief in writing, they could do more. If the destruction of assets leads to increased prosperity, then they should teach this principle by example. Kudlow and Krugman could, for instance, help build the economy by demolishing their own private homes. This would have the immediate effect of stimulating demand for demolition experts, and the longer term affect of stimulating the demand for construction workers. They can create additional wealth by financing the reconstruction of their homes through debt. By borrowing funds, they draw idle resources into use and stimulate financial activity. Of course, they would both initially lose wealth in one way. But if their thinking is sound, they will gain it back many times over as they rebuild. The truth is that their beliefs are fallacious. Bastiat demonstrated the absurdity of destructive creation in his original explanation of the opportunity costs from repairing broken windows. Kudlow is quite clear about his intentions. He wants to grow the economy to finance the war. As Kudlow told some students, "The trick here is to grow the economy and let the economic growth raise the revenue for the war effort"[ii]. Kudlow also praises the Reagan Administration for growing the economy to fund national defense. Here Kudlow's attempts to give economic advice cease completely. His argument here is not that capitalism needs a shot in the arm. It is that resources should be redirected towards ends that he sees fit. Kudlow is a war hawk who, obviously, cannot fund this or any war personally. He instead favors using the state to tax others to fund what he wants, but cannot afford. He seems to think that his values matter more than any other's. Why should anyone else agree with this? Kudlow tarnishes the image of laissez faire economics by parading his faulty reasoning and his claims that his wants should reign supreme as a pro-market stance. Unfortunately, it is sometimes necessary to defend capitalism from alleged advocates of liberty, who employ false dogmas in pursuit of their own militaristic desires. **Capitalism neither requires nor promotes imperialist expansion**. **Capitalism did not** **create** imperialism or **warfare**. Warlike societies predate societies with secure private property. The idea that inequity or underspending give rise to militarism lacks any rational basis. **Imperialistic tendencies exist due to ethnic and nationalistic bigotries**, and the want for power. **Prosperity depends upon our ability to prevent destructive acts**. The dogma of destructive creation fails as a silver lining to the cloud of warfare. Destructive acts entail real costs that diminish available opportunities. The idea that we need to find work for idle hands in capitalism at best leads to a kind of Sisyphus economy where unproductive industries garner subsidies from productive people. At worst, it serves as a supporting argument for war. The more recent versions of the false charges against capitalism do nothing to invalidate two simple facts. **Capitalism generates prosperity** by creating new products. **War** inflicts poverty by **destroy**ing existing **wealth**. There is no sound reason to think otherwise.

### Collectivism bad for enviro property rights key

Veer 12(Pierre-Guy, Independent journalist writing for the Von Mises Institute, 5/2, “Cheer for the Environment, Cheer for Capitalism,” http://www.mises.ca/posts/blog/cheer-for-the-environment-cheer-for-capitalism/)

No Ownership, No Responsibility **How can such a negligence have happened?** It’s simple: **no one was the legitimate owner of the resources** (water, air, ground). **When a property is state-owned** – as was the case under communism – **government has generally little incentive to sustainably exploit it**. **In communist Europe**, **governments wanted to industrialize their country in order**, they hoped, **to catch up with capitalist economies**. **Objectives were set, and they had to be met no matter what. This included the use of brown coal, high in sulfur and that creates heavy smoke** when burned[4], **and questionable farming methods**, which depleted the soil. This lack of vision can also be seen in the public sector of capitalist countries. In the US, the Department of Defense creates more dangerous waste than the top five chemical product companies put together. In fact, pollution is such that cleanup costs are estimated at $20 billion. The same goes for agriculture, where Washington encourages overfarming or even farming not adapted for the environment it’s in[5]. Capitalism, the Green Solution **In order to solve most of the pollution problems, there exists a simple solution: laissez-faire capitalism, i.e. make sure property rights and profitability can be applied**. **The latter helped Eastern Europe**; when communism fell, **capitalism made the countries seek profitable** – and not just cheap – **ways to produce, which greatly reduced pollution**[6]. § Marked 18:41 § As for the former, it proved its effectiveness, notably with the Love Canal[7]. **Property rights are also thought of in order to protect some resources, be it fish**[8] **or endangered species**[9]. **Why such efficiency? Because an owner’s self-interest is directed towards the maximum profitability** of his piece of land. **By containing pollution – as Hooker Chemicals did with its canal – he keeps away from costly lawsuit for property violation**. At the same time, **badly managed pollution can diminish the value of the land, and therefore profits. Any entrepreneur with a long-term vision** – and whose property is safe from arbitrary government decisions – **thinks about all that in order to protect his investment**. One isn’t foolish enough to sack one’s property! In conclusion, I have to mention that I agree with environmentalists that it is importance to preserve the environment in order to protect mother nature and humans. However, I strongly disagree with their means, i.e. government intervention. Considering it very seldom has a long-term vision, it is the worst thing that can happen. In fact, one could says that **most environmental disasters are**, directly or indirectly, **caused** by the State, mainly **by a lack of clear property rights**. Were they clearer, they would let each and everyone of us, out of self-interest, protect the environment in a better manner. That way, everyone’s a winner.

### No root cause of war – focus on the particulars instead

Gat 9 [Azar, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War, European Journal of International Relations, 2009, Vol. 15(4): 571–599, http://ejt.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/15/4/571]

This article’s contribution is two-pronged: it argues that IR theory regarding the causes of conflict and war is deeply flawed, locked for decades in ultimately futile debates over narrow, misconstrued concepts; this conceptual confusion is untangled and the debate is transcended once a broader, comprehensive, and evolutionarily informed perspective is adopted. Thus attempts to find the root cause of war in the nature of either the individual, the state, or the international system are fundamentally misplaced. In all these ‘levels’ there are necessary but not sufficient causes for war, and the whole cannot be broken into pieces.13 People’s needs and desires — which may be pursued violently — as well as the resulting quest for power and the state of mutual apprehension which fuel the security dilemma are all molded in human nature (some of them existing only as options, potentials, and skills in a behavioral ‘tool kit’); they are so molded because of strong evolutionary pressures that have shaped humans in their struggle for survival over geological times, when all the above literally constituted matters of life and death. The violent option of human competition has been largely curbed within states, yet is occasionally taken up on a large scale between states because of the anarchic nature of the inter-state system. However, returning to step one, international anarchy in and of itself would not be an explanation for war were it not for the potential for violence in a fundamental state of competition over scarce resources that is imbedded in reality and, consequently, in human nature. The necessary and sufficient causes of war — that obviously have to be filled with the particulars of the case in any specific war — are thus as follows: politically organized actors that operate in an environment where no superior authority effectively monopolizes power resort to violence when they assess it to be their most cost-effective option for winning and/or defending evolution-shaped objects of desire, and/or their power in the system that can help them win and/or defend those desired goods. Wars have been fought for the attainment of the same objects of human desire that underlie the human motivational system in general — only by violent means, through the use of force. Politics — internal and external — of which war is, famously, a continuation, is the activity intended to achieve at the intra- and inter-state ‘levels’ the very same evolution-shaped human aims we have already seen. Some writers have felt that ‘politics’ does not fully encompass the causes of war. Even Thayer (2004: 178–9), who correctly argues that evolutionary theory explains ultimate human aims, nonetheless goes on to say, inconsistently, that Clausewitz needs extension because war is caused not only by political reasons but also by the evolutionarily rooted search for resources, as if the two were separate, with politics being somehow different and apart, falling outside of the evolutionary logic. What is defined as ‘politics’ is of course a matter of semantics, and like all definitions is largely arbitrary. Yet, as has been claimed here, if not attributed to divine design, organisms’ immensely complex mechanisms and the behavioral propensities that emanate from them — including those of human beings — ultimately could only have been ‘engineered’ through evolution. The challenge is to lay out how evolution-shaped human desires relate to one another in motivating war. The desire and struggle for scarce resources — wealth of all sorts — have always been regarded as a prime aim of ‘politics’ and an obvious motive for war. They seem to require little further elaboration. By contrast, reproduction does not appear to figure as a direct motive for war in large-scale societies. However, as we saw, appearance is often deceptive, for somatic and reproductive motives are the two inseparable sides of the same coin. In modern societies, too, sexual adventure remained central to individual motivation in going to war, even if it usually failed to be registered at the level of ‘state politics.’ This may be demonstrated by the effects of the sexual revolution since the 1960s, which, by lessening the attraction of foreign adventure for recruits and far increasing the attraction of staying at home, may have contributed to advanced societies’ growing aversion to war. Honor, status, glory, and dominance — both individual and collective — enhanced access to somatic and reproductive success and were thus hotly pursued and defended, even by force. The security dilemma sprang from this state of actual and potential competition, in turn pouring more oil onto its fire. Power has been the universal currency through which all of the above could be obtained and/or defended, and has been sought after as such, in an often escalating spiral. Kinship — expanding from family and tribe to peoples — has always exerted overwhelming influence in determining one’s loyalty and willingness to sacrifice in the defense and promotion of a common good. Shared culture is a major attribute of ethnic communities, in the defense of which people can be invested as heavily as in the community’s political independence and overall prosperity. Finally, religious and secular ideologies have been capable of stirring enormous zeal and violence; for grand questions of cosmic and socio-political order have been perceived as possessing paramount practical significance for securing and promoting life on earth and/or in the afterlife. In the human problem-solving menus, ideologies function as the most general blueprints. Rather than comprising a ‘laundry list’ of causes for war, all of the above partake in the interconnected human motivational system, originally shaped by the calculus of survival and reproduction.

### War exacerbates structural impacts

Joshua S. Goldstein, pub. date: 2001, Prof. of IR @ American University, Washington D.C. He is the author of a broad range of research works on international conflict, cooperation, and political economy, with a central focus on great-power relations and world order, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, Cambridge University, pp. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (or perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach beings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although theses influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war, It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice beings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

# 2NC

#### **Maintaining heg is the only way to prevent extinction. Liberalism has empirically deescalated hotspot areas of conflict through globalization, led to the spread of human rights, and increased living conditions. Maintaining primacy is k2 preventing a transition to multipolarity that resembles the first half of the 20th century where over a hundred million people died in wars of power politics.**

#### **War is at its lowest level in history because of US primacy---best statistical studies prove heg solves war because it makes democratic peace resilient and globalization sustainable---it’s the deeper cause of proximate checks against war**

Owen 11 John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of VirginiaPhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### **And heg is k2 solve the aff – even if their alternate worldview works in theory, the transition away from heg would spur antidemocratic coalitions and radical fundamentalists that prohibit free-speech, assuring their new methodology is never heard. Only a world of heg has the potential for social change.**

#### **U.S. leadership precludes international hostility and violence, it’s the solution to all modern forms of instability**

Khalilzad ’95(Zalmay, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995\_

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

### A2 Endless War

#### Even if heg isn’t great, the alternative is lash-out and violent cling to power

Goldstein, 7 (Professor of Global Politics and International Relations @ University of Pennsylvania “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 30, Issue 4 & 5 August 2007, pages 639 – 682)

Two closely related, though distinct, theoretical arguments focus explicitly on the consequences for international politics of a shift in power between a dominant state and a rising power. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin suggested that peace prevails when a dominant state’s capabilities enable it to ‘govern’ an international order that it has shaped. Over time, however, as economic and technological diffusion proceeds during eras of peace and development, other states are empowered. Moreover, the burdens of international governance drain and distract the reigning hegemon, and challengers eventually emerge who seek to rewrite the rules of governance. As the power advantage of the erstwhile hegemon ebbs, it may become desperate enough to resort to the ultima ratio of international politics, force, to forestall the increasingly urgent demands of a rising challenger. Or as the power of the challenger rises, it may be tempted to press its case with threats to use force. It is the rise and fall of the great powers that creates the circumstances under which major wars, what Gilpin labels ‘hegemonic wars’, break out. Gilpin’s argument logically encourages pessimism about the implications of a rising China. It leads to the expectation that international trade, investment, and technology transfer will result in a steady diffusion of American economic power, beneﬁting the rapidly developing states of the world, including China. As the US simultaneously scurries to put out the many brushﬁres that threaten its far-ﬂung global interests (i.e., the classic problem of overextension), it will be unable to devote sufﬁcient resources to maintain or restore its former advantage over emerging competitors like China. While the erosion of the once clear American advantage plays itself out, the US will ﬁnd it ever more difﬁcult to preserve the order in Asia that it created during its era of preponderance. The expectation is an increase in the likelihood for the use of force – either by a Chinese challenger able to ﬁeld a stronger military in support of its demands for greater inﬂuence over international arrangements in Asia, or by a besieged American hegemon desperate to head off further decline. Among the trends that alarm those who would look at Asia through the lens of Gilpin’s theory are China’s expanding share of world trade and wealth (much of it resulting from the gains made possible by the international economic order a dominant US established); its acquisition of technology in key sectors that have both civilian and military applications (e.g., information, communications, and electronics linked with the ‘revolution in military affairs’); and an expanding military burden for the US (as it copes with the challenges of its global war on terrorism and especially its struggle in Iraq) that limits the resources it can devote to preserving its interests in East Asia. Although similar to Gilpin’s work insofar as it emphasizes the importance of shifts in the capabilities of a dominant state and a rising challenger, the power-transition theory A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler present in The War Ledger focuses more closely on the allegedly dangerous phenomenon of ‘crossover’– the point at which a dissatisﬁed challenger is about to overtake the established leading state. In such cases, when the power gap narrows, the dominant state becomes increasingly desperate to forestall, and the challenger becomes increasingly determined to realize the transition to a new international order whose contours it will deﬁne. Though suggesting why a rising China may ultimately present grave dangers for international peace when its capabilities make it a peer competitor of America, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory is less clear about the dangers while a potential challenger still lags far behind and faces a difﬁcult struggle to catch up. This clariﬁcation is important in thinking about the theory’s relevance to interpreting China’s rise because a broad consensus prevails among analysts that Chinese military capabilities are at a minimum two decades from putting it in a league with the US in Asia. Their theory, then, points with alarm to trends in China’s growing wealth and power relative to the United States, but especially looks ahead to what it sees as the period of maximum danger – that time when a dissatisﬁed China could be in a position to overtake the US on dimensions believed crucial for assessing power. Reports beginning in the mid-1990s that offered extrapolations suggesting China’s growth would give it the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP aggregate, not per capita) sometime in the ﬁrst few decades of the twentieth century fed these sorts of concerns about a potentially dangerous challenge to American leadership in Asia. The huge gap between Chinese and American military capabilities (especially in terms of technological sophistication) has so far discouraged prediction of comparably disquieting trends on this dimension, but inklings of similar concerns may be reﬂected in occasionally alarmist reports about purchases of advanced Russian air and naval equipment, as well as concern that Chinese espionage may have undermined the American advantage in nuclear and missile technology, and speculation about the potential military purposes of China’s manned space program. Moreover, because a dominant state may react to the prospect of a crossover and believe that it is wiser to embrace the logic of preventive war and act early to delay a transition while the task is more manageable, Organski and Kugler’s power transition theory also provides grounds for concern about the period prior to the possible crossover.

### A2 Retrenchment

#### Costs are contextually marginal—withdrawal is way worse

Kagan 12 (Not Fade Away The myth of American decline. Robert Kagan senior fellow at Brookings Inst. January 11, 2012 | 5:04 pm; The New Republic, http://goo.gl/SEyOM)

If we are serious about this exercise in accounting, moreover, the costs of maintaining this position cannot be measured without considering the costs of losing it. Some of the costs of reducing the American role in the world are, of course, unquantifiable. What is it worth to Americans to live in a world dominated by democracies rather than by autocracies? But some of the potential costs could be measured, if anyone cared to try. If the decline of American military power produced an unraveling of the international economic order that American power has helped sustain; if trade routes and waterways ceased to be as secure, because the U.S. Navy was no longer able to defend them; if regional wars broke out among great powers because they were no longer constrained by the American superpower; if American allies were attacked because the United States appeared unable to come to their defense; if the generally free and open nature of the international system became less so—if all this came to pass, there would be measurable costs. And it is not too far-fetched to imagine that these costs would be far greater than the savings gained by cutting the defense and foreign aid budgets by $100 billion a year. You can save money by buying a used car without a warranty and without certain safety features, but what happens when you get into an accident? American military strength reduces the risk of accidents by deterring conflict, and lowers the price of the accidents that occur by reducing the chance of losing. These savings need to be part of the calculation, too. As a simple matter of dollars and cents, it may be a lot cheaper to preserve the current level of American involvement in the world than to reduce it.

### A2 China

#### In particular the rise of China causes transition conflicts

Kagan12(Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, Financial Times chief foreign affairs commentator, “[The Rise or Fall of the American Empire](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire),” 2/14/12) <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the_rise_or_fall_of_the_american_empire?page=full>

The main point of my book, in fact, is to examine what might happen in the world should the United States prove incapable of continuing as the predominant power and slip into a rough equality with other powers, like China. I'm afraid it is optimistic to believe that China will pose only an economic challenge to the United States under those circumstances. The effects of a new multipolar world will be far-reaching. I sometimes think we have forgotten how countries behave as their power increases. We have been living so long in a world where one power has been so much more powerful than all the others. The existence of the American hegemon has forced all other powers to exercise unusual restraint, curb normal ambitions, and avoid actions that might lead to the formation of a U.S.-led coalition of the kind that defeated Germany twice, Japan once, and the Soviet Union, more peacefully, in the Cold War.¶ The Chinese, as good historians, are acutely aware of the fate that befell these others and have worked hard to avoid a similar fate, following as best they can Deng Xiaoping's advice to "keep a low profile and never take the lead." As relative power shifts, however, that advice becomes harder and harder to follow. We saw some early signs of what the future might hold in China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The response of the United States, which swung in behind the nervous powers in the region, has possibly convinced the Chinese that their moves were premature. They may have themselves bought in too much to the widespread talk of America in decline. Were that decline to become real in the coming years, however, it is a certainty that Chinese pressures and probes will return. Greater relative power on China's part might also lead Beijing to become less patient with Taiwan's lack of movement toward acquiescing to the mainland's sovereignty. A situation in which U.S. power were declining, China's power were rising, and the Taiwan issue became fractious is practically a textbook instance of how wars start -- even if neither side wants war. That is why some have referred to Taiwan as East Asia's Sarajevo.

### A2 Disease

#### Countermeasures and basic biology show how absurd this impact is

Coates 2009 – former adjunct professor at George Washington University, President of the Kanawha Institute for the Study of the Future and was President of the International Association for Impact Assessment and was President of the Association for Science, Technology and Innovation, M.S., Hon D., FWAAS, FAAAS, (Joseph F., Futures 41, 694-705, "Risks and threats to civilization, humankind, and the earth”, ScienceDirect, WEA)

**Could diseases** in animals **be converted in a lab**oratory **into ones transmissible among people**? The answer is **yes, but it is very unlikely** that **one could accomplish this easily and** if one did have an organism that would transmit from animal to people, and then people to people**, it would only be significant if that animal was widely distributed** in the target area. So birds would be ideal and rats might be significant. **There are few** other **animals** around **to transmit** to people unless we consider pets and insects. **We have** pretty **good protection against insects and, in a crisis, we would be ready to us**e somewhat more dangerous **materials like DDT** to fight a contaminated invasion until we developed other remedies. The serious limitation on self-propagating diseases generated for terrorists’ purposes is that it could be self-defeating because **if it is** effectively **self-propagating, it will eventually bounce back to the attacking country** and, presumably, have similar effects there as it has in the target country.¶ **Early detection** of disease spread **is** fairly **straightforward** in terms of modern epidemiology in most parts of the world. The most dramatic effects, aside from deaths, would be in the preventive measure to reduce the propagation of the disease from spreading by extremely severe reduction in travel for both people and cargoes, domestically and internationally. This may extend for quite a time until a preventive measure or vaccine is developed, tested and proven. Even assuming that an enemy initiated an attack, there would be the problem of where and what would happen as we learned about the attack. Would it become self-limiting? Suppose they managed a release in ten cities. Those ten **largest cities**, perhaps, represent 10% of the population and we **could take internal measures**, as suggested above, **to contain it** in those cities. **Pandemics are** a credible catastrophic situation slowing and disrupting the economy and society but **not threatening nationhood in** the **advanced nations.** A high death-rate pandemic is likely to create a greater setback in Worlds 2 and 3. The Black Death in Europe 1347–1352 killed an estimated third of the population, 25 million people. **The Spanish Flu** in 1918 killed 20–50 million people and infected a billion. The latter **had no lasting effects** comprising a threat **to stability**.

## Case

### Epistmeology

#### C/A to Kagan K

#### Weigh our specific evidence to get closer to the truth

Kratochwil 2008 (Friedrich Kratochwil, professor of international relations at European University Institute, 2008

(Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213)

In what follows, I claim that the shift in focus from “demonstration” to science as practice provides strong prima facie reasons to choose pragmatic rather than traditional epistemological criteria in social analysis.

Irrespective of its various forms, the epistemological project includes an argument that all warranted knowledge has to satisfy certain field- independent criteria that are specified by philosophy (a “theory of know- ledge”). The real issue of how our concepts and the world relate to each other, and on which non-idiosyncratic grounds we are justified to hold on to our beliefs about the world, is “answered” by two metaphors. The first is that of an inconvertible ground, be it the nature of things, certain intuitions (Des- cartes’ “clear and distinct ideas”) or methods and inferences; the second is that of a “mirror” that shows what is the case.¶ There is no need to rehearse the arguments demonstrating that these under- lying beliefs and metaphors could not sustain the weight placed upon them. A “method” à la Descartes could not make good on its claims, as it depended ultimately on the guarantee of God that concepts and things in the outer world match. On the other hand, the empiricist belief in direct observation forgot that “facts” which become “data” are – as the term suggests – “made”. They are based on the judgements of the observer using cultural criteria, even if they appear to be based on direct perception, as is the case with colours.4¶ Besides, there had always been a sneaking suspicion that the epistemological ideal of certainty and rigour did not quite fit the social world, an objection voiced first by humanists such as Vico, and later rehearsed in the continuing controversies about erklären and verstehen (Weber 1991; for a more recent treatment see Hollis 1994). In short, both the constitutive nature of our concepts, and the value interest in which they are embedded, raise peculiar issues of meaning and contestation that are quite different from those of description. As Vico (1947) suggested, we “understand” the social world because we have “made it”, a point raised again by Searle concerning both the crucial role played by ascriptions of meaning (x counts for y) in the social world and the distinction between institutional “facts” from “brute” or natural facts (Searle 1995). Similarly, since values are constitutive for our “interests”, the concepts we use always portray an action from a certain point of view; this involves appraisals and prevents us from accepting allegedly “neutral” descriptions that would be meaningless. Thus, when we say that someone “abandoned” another person and hence communicate a (contestable) appraisal, we want to call attention to certain important moral implica- tions of an act. Attempting to eliminate the value-tinge in the description and insisting that everything has to be cast in neutral, “objective”, observational language – such as “he opened the door and went through it” – would indeed make the statement “pointless”, even if it is (trivially) “true” (for a powerful statement of this point, see Connolly 1983).¶ The most devastating attack on the epistemological project, however, came from the history of science itself. It not only corrected the naive view of knowledge generation as mere accumulation of data, but it also cast increasing doubt on the viability of various field-independent “demarcation criteria”. This was, for the most part, derived from the old Humean argument that only sentences with empirical content were “meaningful”, while value statements had to be taken either as statements about individual preferences or as meaningless, since de gustibus non est disputandum. As the later dis- cussion in the Vienna circle showed, this distinction was utterly unhelpful (Popper 1965: ch. 2). It did not solve the problem of induction, and failed to acknowledge that not all meaningful theoretical sentences must correspond with natural facts.¶ Karl Popper’s ingenious solution of making “refutability” the logical cri- terion and interpreting empirical “tests” as a special mode of deduction (rather than as a way of increasing supporting evidence) seemed to respond to this epistemological quandary for a while. An “historical reconstruction” of science as a progressive development thus seemed possible, as did the specification of a pragmatic criterion for conducting research.¶ Yet again, studies in the history of science undermined both hopes. The different stages in Popper’s own intellectual development are, in fact, rather telling. He started out with a version of conjectures and refutations that was based on the notion of a more or less self-correcting demonstration. Con- fronted with the findings that scientists did not use the refutation criterion in their research, he emphasised then the role of the scientific community on which the task of “refutation” devolved. Since the individual scientist might not be ready to bite the bullet and admit that she or he might have been wrong, colleagues had to keep him or her honest. Finally, towards the end of his life, Popper began to rely less and less on the stock of knowledge or on the scientists’ shared theoretical understandings – simply devalued as the “myth of the framework” – and emphasised instead the processes of communica- tion and of “translation” among different schools of thought within a scien- tific community (Popper 1994). He still argued that these processes follow the pattern of “conjecture and refutation”, but the model was clearly no longer that of logic or of scientific demonstration, but one that he derived from his social theory – from his advocacy of an “open society” (Popper 1966). Thus a near total reversal of the ideal of knowledge had occurred. While formerly everything was measured in terms of the epistemological ideal derived from logic and physics, “knowledge” was now the result of deliberation and of certain procedural notions for assessing competing knowledge claims. Politics and law, rather than physics, now provided the template.¶ Thus the history of science has gradually moved away from the epistemo- logical ideal to focus increasingly on the actual practices of various scientific communities engaged in knowledge production, particularly on how they handle problems of scientific disagreement.5 This reorientation implied a move away from field-independent criteria and from the demonstrative ideal to one in which “arguments” and the “weight” of evidence had to be appraised. This, in turn, not only generated a bourgeoning field of “science studies” and their “social” epistemologies (see Fuller 1991), but also suggested more generally that the traditional understandings of knowledge production based on the model of “theory” were in need of revision.¶ If the history of science therefore provides strong reasons for a pragmatic turn, as the discussion above illustrates, what remains to be shown is how this turn relates to the historical, linguistic and constructivist turns that preceded it. To start with, from the above it should be clear that, in the social world, we are not dealing with natural kinds that exist and are awaiting, so to speak, prepackaged, their placement in the appropriate box. The objects we investi- gate are rather conceptual creations and they are intrinsically linked to the language through which the social world is constituted. Here “constructivists”, particularly those influenced by Wittgenstein and language philosophy, easily link up with “pragmatists” such as Rorty, who emphasises the product- ive and pragmatic role of “vocabularies” rather than conceiving of language as a “mirror of nature” (Rorty 1979).¶ Furthermore, precisely because social facts are not natural, but have to be reproduced through the actions of agents, any attempt to treat them like “brute” facts becomes doubly problematic. For one, even “natural” facts are not simply “there”; they are interpretations based on our theories. Secondly, different from the observation of natural facts, in which perceptions address a “thing” through a conceptually mediated form, social reality is entirely “arti- ficial” in the sense that it is dependent on the beliefs and practices of the actors themselves. This reproductive process, directed by norms, always engenders change either interstitially, when change is small-scale or adaptive – or more dramatically, when it becomes “transformative” – for instance when it produces a new system configuration, as after the advent of national- ism (Lapid and Kratochwil 1995) or after the demise of the Soviet Union (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994). Consequently, any examination of the social world has to become in a way “historical” even if some “structuralist” theories attempt to minimise this dimension. [. . .]¶ Therefore a pragmatic approach to social science and IR seems both necessary and promising. ¶ On the one hand, it is substantiated by the failure of the epistemological project that has long dominated the field. On the other, it offers a different positive heuristics that challenges IR’s traditional disciplin- ary boundaries and methodological assumptions. Interest in pragmatism therefore does not seem to be just a passing fad – even if such an interpre- tation cannot entirely be discounted, given the incentives of academia to find, just like advertising agencies, “new and improved” versions of familiar products.

#### Our method of obtaining this knowledge is good- economic rationality has allowed for the expansion of markets that has lifted people out of poverty- entrepreneurs are the model for capitalism

Ebenstein 03(Alan, adjunct scholar at the Cato institute, author of the first English language biography of Hayek, received his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics, Hayek’s Journey: The Mind of Friedrich Hayek Palgrave Macmillan p. 238-239)

To convince the leaders of public opinion of “this truth” became Hayek’s major project, and in considerable part he succeeded in this task. He wrote in the published version of The Fatal Conceit, in sentiments that were largely his alone: “The dispute between the market order and socialism is no less than a matter of survival. To follow socialist morality would destroy much of present [man]kind and impoverish much of the rest.” Classical socialism is dead. The division of knowledge is the factual premise on which economic systems and societies should be based. The fragmentation of knowledge renders central government control of an economy impossible, he argued. The best societies and economies are those that recognize and accommodate divided knowledge. He emphasized that as a result of inevitable imperfections in human knowledge and communication, free market order is the most productive. It overcomes the division of knowledge and the absence of verbal knowledge. The great insight toward the end of his career that he attempted to enunciate in “The Fatal Conceit” is that humanity’s instinctive emotions are often at war with the morals, rules, and laws necessary to sustain free market order. Through understanding this conﬂict, humanity may resolve it. The struggle between the advocates of free market order and of classical socialism is not, Hayek concluded, a moral but an intellectual one: “The main point of my argument is... that the conﬂict between... advocates of the spontaneous extended human order created by a competitive market... [and] those who demand a deliberate arrangement of human interaction by central authority based on collective command over available resources is due to a factual error by the latter about how knowledge of these resources is and can be generated and utilized. As a question of fact, this conﬂict must be settled by scientiﬁc study.” “I am now profoundly convinced,” he believed, “of what I had only hinted at before, namely, that the struggle between the advocates of a free society and the advocates of the socialist system is not a moral but an intellectual conﬂict.” “What I am trying to do in The Fatal Conceit is to show that their [classical socialists’] argument is wholly based on factual mistakes.” The division of knowledge, Hayek thought, precludes classical socialism. Ignorance of this truth, he believed, was the greatest obstacle to increased and improved economic production. Now, of course, through the Internet and other improvements in communication technology, it is possible to centralize knowledge and decision making as never before. To the extent that Hayek’s arguments for free market order rest on the inability to centralize knowledge and decision making, circumstances are likely to change—perhaps dramatically—in the years ahead. John Stuart Mill wrote 150 years ago in his great work Utilitarianism: “No one whose opinion deserves a moment’s consideration can doubt that most of the great... evils of the world are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society.... Even that most intractable of enemies, disease, may be indeﬁnitely reduced in dimensions....All the grand sources...of human suffering are in a great degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort.” The economic problem for much of the world is close to being solved. While, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, extreme privation regularly occurs, almost every other major population area on earth is now in better shape. There is no reason that this trend of improvement should not continue. In short, as Mill had it, almost all the main sources of human suffering may be conquered by “human care and effort.” The greatest human population combined with the highest standard of living is both the utilitarian and the libertarian vision. It is impossible to say what institutions, laws, policies, and ideas are most likely to guide humanity in the future. In his later years, Hayek gave some consideration to the work of John Rawls,who would perhaps be considered, together with Hayek and Leo Strauss, one of the three greatest political philosophers of the twentieth century. Rawls had a highly liberal (in a twentieth-century sense) perspective. His idea of a “difference principle” (sometimes also referred to as “maximin”—maximizing the status of the minimum class) may prove lasting. This Rawlsian idea is that society’s laws and rules should be structured so that those who are least well off in the society in question would have the highest standard of living as in any other possible society at the point in time. While Rawls thought that this would, empirically, result in societies in which material rewards would be quite evenly possessed, there is no reason that this should necessarily be the case. As human knowledge of genetics increases, it becomes clearer that environmental explanations for many human abilities, capacities, and talents are not as strong as they appeared even two decades ago. The idea that, for example, being good at math or language or art is strictly or even mostly an environmental outcome is increasingly becoming considered not to be the case. If individual humanity’s talents are inherently diverse, it is likely that this diversity would manifest itself in social diversity. Diversity of social outcomes would be unexpected and would be especially unjust in a society in which everyone were innately identical. The largely natalocracy that existed everywhere until a century ago—whereby those in positions of authority and wealth did not necessarily have ability, and those with ability did not necessarily have authority and wealth; economic position was largely a matter of birth—was especially unjust to able individuals of the lower classes. Intellectuals were a larger part of the working-class movement early in the twentieth century than is the case sixty to one hundred years later. Moreover, the injustice of not being able to rise to positions justiﬁed by their merits must have been particularly galling to truly intelligent and able individuals, when many positions of authority and wealth were held by persons almost exclusively on the basis of birth, and when genuine poverty existed among large numbers of intact families with no government safety net and a much lower standard of living than is today the case. Democratic capitalist societies have become more meritocratic than any societies and economies in history, and their economic productivity demonstrates this reality. The freedom to exchange goods and services that capitalism allows has resulted in the greatest economic production ever. While democratic and capitalist meritocracy is by no means perfect, it is more effective than any previous system. There is no reason to assume that a society in which the living standard of the minimum class is maximized would be egalitarian. In fact, the opposite may be true. Once the basics of food, clothing, shelter, education,and healthcare are guaranteed to every person in a society, as is more or less the case in every developed economy in the world today, the issues of so- cial minima assume different character. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once argued in the House of Commons that the Conservative Party favored a society in which everyone at every step on the economic ladder would have the most, even if this resulted in more inequality, while the Labour Party preferred a society in which there would be more equality, even though everyone at every step on the economic ladder would have less. Socialism and communism are no more dead today than capitalism was during the 1930s and 1940s. The ideas behind the words of socialism and communism—of greater equality in the possession of the fruits of collective effort and of the abolition of private property—will undoubtedly ﬁnd support again, though perhaps not for decades. Now is the time of the entrepreneur. One of the great contributions of Austrian economists from Joseph Schumpeter to Israel Kirzner is to emphasize entrepreneurs, who typically possess tacit or implicit, as opposed to verbal or explicit, knowledge. They cannot necessarily say how they do what they do, but their works speak for themselves. The relationship between the tacit knowledge of entrepreneurs and proﬁts is vital to capitalistic production. In a capitalist system, the ability of entrepreneurs to make proﬁts is what allows them to direct continually greater amounts of resources. When Hayek referred to competition as a discovery procedure, he meant in part that through competition, the individuals who are best at utilizing resources receive more proﬁts and thus the ability to continue their trade. Those who are not as effective at using resources do not. Collected works general editor Bruce Caldwell describes Hayek’s conception of tacit knowledge: “... the skills of craftsmen or athletes, the ‘knowledge how’ to perform certain ‘hard to do’ tasks. People who possess such skills typically cannot state how they do what they do.” Not all knowledge is verbal. Hayek early considered that the subtitle for the whole threepart The Fatal Conceit should have been The Intellectual Error of Socialism. He disagreed with socialists primarily about facts, not values, which is why the subtitle (apparently reinserted and modiﬁed by Bartley) of the published version of the work, The Errors of Socialism, was misleading. Hayek’s point was the narrower, intellectual one. “Life has no purpose but itself,” Hayek wrote in The Fatal Conceit (in words that apparently were his own)—to be abundant, overﬂowing, joyous. Classical socialists and present-day libertarians do not necessarily disagree about values. They disagree about facts. They disagree about the best way to produce the most goods and the most services for the most people. There is no necessary division among socialists, libertarians, and communists in values. Indeed, libertarianism might be said to emanate from socialism (just as socialism emanated from classical liberalism) and to be consistent with communism, to the extent that all seek the greatest material wealth or happiness for the greatest number. The explosion of communicative technology, particularly and especially of the written word, and of other technological knowledge render greater centralization of societies, hierarchicalization of decision-making, and expansion of multinational police power to patrol the world for potential weapons of mass destruction all but inevitable in the immediate future. The world of 2013 may bear little resemblance to that of 2003. While classical socialism in the form of government ownership and management of the means of economic production proved unsuccessful during the twentieth century, this does not imply that the idea of socialism—as greater equality in the possession of the fruits of collective effort—is dead. Indeed, it likely will rise again with renewed vigor, both domestically and throughout the world. Those days should not come too soon. John Stuart Mill, again, held as long ago as the middle of the nineteenth century that it would be better for the efforts of mankind to be employed in economic pursuits than in those of war and violence. Capitalism is a peaceful creed. Focus on increased wealth for all is typically positive because the only way that this can come about is through production of many more goods and services for billions of people. Classical twentieth-century socialism in the form of government ownership and management of the means of economic production exactly reversed the true socialist idea. The core idea of socialism is not greater equality in the production of wealth; it is greater equality in the possession of wealth. In a growing economy, there is no reason why there cannot be both increasing absolute resources directed to government and a gradually reducing government role. There is no necessary correlation between an increasing absolute government role in a society and an increasing relative role, although, of course, the former makes the latter more likely. For the immediate future, however, much of the goal should be, as it was during the nineteenth century, to reduce the excrescences of government that result in so much material and economic waste and prevent people from living their lives as they please. Hayek’s view of the ethical good was not exclusively material. He acknowledged that there is great natural beauty, and he emphasized the virtues of the mind

above all else. However, he concluded “The Moral Imperative of the Market”: “At this critical juncture for the kind of civilisation that we have built up, the most important contribution an economist can make is to insist that we can fulﬁl our responsibility to sustain our existing population only by continuing to rely on the market system, which brought this enlarged population into existence in the ﬁrst place.” He wrote in The Constitution of Liberty a quarter of a century before: “At this moment, when the greater part of mankind has only just awakened to the possibility of abolishing starvation, ﬁlth, and disease; when it has just been touched by the expanding wave of modern technology after centuries or millennia of relative stability;... even a small decline in our rate of advance might be fatal to us.” Only continued material development may literally preserve the planet. Self-described “environmentalists” who, in the name of protecting the earth, attempt to stop progress in fact may condemn the earth to destruction. Only further technological development will allow billions of people to have the standard of living now enjoyed in western Europe and the United States. Spiritual values are the highest values. The philosophical-moral view on which Hayek’s proposals for optimal government, state, and societal order were based is that all people everywhere should have the highest standard of living possible. This was his moral intent. He did not believe in God, but he thought that individuals should do what they can to make the world as good a place as it can be for themselves and for others. This is what he sought to do. The only answer to the higher standard of living for all that Hayek sought is the creation of much more wealth, not the redistribution of existing wealth. Capitalism will remain as long as it is the most productive economic system. When this day passes, so, too, will capitalism. Capitalists who insist on the necessity of capitalism themselves display the fatal conceit. The libertarian age—the age of peace and plenty—is here, a time of the highest quality of life for the most people around the world.

#### This economic rationality produces the most productive ontology- it is the most accurate description of how humans interact

Boetke 03(Peter, professor of economics at George Mason ,Review of “Economics as Ideology”, published in Revue de Philosophie economique, http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/pboettke/pubs/recenstion\_douvrage.pdf)

It is my belief that Hoover is led to this, and other positions in his book that I find objectionable, because he fails to see economics as a discipline which can provide us with knowledge equivalent in ontological stature to the law of gravity and that democratic deliberations often produce economic policies that are the equivalent of engineering proposals for human beings to float rather than walk or drive to their next destination. If my characterization is correct, then as we saw in the quote from Mises, the economists will find themselves in opposition to proposed policy solutions to right this or that perceived social wrong. The economist is put in the unenviable position of reminding fellow citizens that wishing it so doesn't necessarily make it so. The science of economics puts parameters on our utopias, and those who advocate utopian solutions cannot stand any suggestion that their plan for the future is unworkable. The discipline of economics in addition to providing a critique, also suggests that any alternative arrangement being proposed must specify the institutional mechanisms by which incentives between actors will become aligned and the correct information will flow to right actors in time for them to make appropriate decisions or learn from their previous decisions that mistakes were made so the appropriate adjustments will be made. If no mechanism is in place, then incentive incompatibilities and coordination failures will result so that no matter how beautiful the proposed policy might appear on paper the solution will be one of economic waste and political opportunism. Because Hoover's book doesn't deal with economic science in such a sustained way, it cannot at the end of the day explain the evolution of modern economic thought and without that there is no way to understand the creation of contemporary politics in the wake of the breakdown of the Keynesian consensus in the 1970s, the collapse of communism in the 1980s and the realization of the tragic failure of development planning in the third world in the 1990s. Economic reality, it turns out more than psycho-history is the best way to understand the way the world work. The distinction between ontology and epistemology are often forgotten in discussions of the methodology and philosophy of the social sciences. We come to know the laws of gravity in a manner different than we come to know the law of demand (question of epistemology), but the forces at work that are described by the law of gravity and the law of demand are nevertheless real in the same way (question of ontology). The argument for methodological dualism between the natural and social sciences that was made by Mises and then Hayek crucially relies on this distinction between ontology and epistemology. In other words, economics is capable of establishing laws that have the same ontological claim as those derived in physics, but they are arrived at through procedures of inquiry entirely different from those employed in the natural sciences.

#### Epistemology doesn’t indict observations of material reality

Wendt 2000 (Alexander Wendt, Professor of International Security and PolSci, Ohio State, 2000 On the Via Media, Review of International Studies 26)

In the book I argue that, compared to ontology-talk, the value of epistemology talk **for** a discipline like **IR** is considerably less than something as imposing as the third ‘Great Debate’ might suggest. What matters more is what there is, not how we can know it, since we clearly do know things, and the ‘how’ of this knowledge will necessarily vary with the many different kinds of questions we ask in our field, and the varied tools at our disposal for answering them.

### FW

#### Creates a sloppy political frame that forecloses pedagogical resistance

Hartwich 9 [Oliver is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies, Executive Highlights No 829, “The great neoliberal misunderstanding”, Centre for Independent Studies, May 21] //

When Kevin Rudd published his lengthy essay on the global financial crisis, it was not only an attempt to strengthen his reputation as Australia’s philosopher prime minister but also meant to mark the day of reckoning for neoliberalism. ‘Neoliberalism,’ Mr Rudd told us, ‘has been revealed as little more than personal greed dressed up as an economic philosophy.’ Despite this stark rhetoric, Rudd’s essay only revealed one thing: **Neoliberalism is one of the most sloppily used words in today’s political debate**s. The original philosophy of **neoliberalism,** of which the prime minister seems unaware**, was decidedly anti-capitalist and the very opposite of a laissez faire free-for-all. The term neoliberalism was invented at the time of the Great Depressio**n in the 1930s. The belief in eternal prosperity had been shattered by Wall Street’s ‘Black Friday’ and the events that followed. Liberalism and capitalism were blamed for the global economic crisis. Around the world, economists like John Maynard **Keynes** and politicians like US President Franklin D Roosevelt **were looking for alternatives to a system that they thought had failed spectacularly.**  In Germany, too, the mood had turned against unfettered capitalism. However, not everybody believed that this had to mean a complete departure from a market-based economy. The young German economist and sociologist Alexander Rüstow certainly did not. **In a speech he delivered in 1932, which is regarded as one of the founding documents of neoliberalism, he called for a ‘Third Way’ between socialism and capitalism**. Rüstow’s speech was titled ‘Free Economy, Strong State,’ and in these four words he summed up the core of the neoliberal project**. He rejected markets left to their own device**s. Such markets, he was convinced, would always degenerate. ‘**We agree with Marxists and socialists in the conviction that capitalism is untenable and needs to be overcome**,’ Rüstow wrote in a later essay. If laissez faire and Adam Smith style liberalism were so bad according to Rüstow, would he then have preferred a planned economy? His answer was a resounding no. With the same rhetorical verve he used to condemn capitalism, he equally rejected the promises of socialism and communism. They were no viable economic systems, and they were also incompatible with democracy, freedom, and human dignity. All of this led Rüstow to call for a middle way between laissez faire and socialism, a ‘Third Way.’ ‘We should be happy,’ he wrote, ‘that we do not have to make a difficult choice between capitalism and communism, but that there is a Third Way.’ Ironically, **it is the very same logic that makes today’s critics of neoliberalism claim that one no longer had to choose between Hayek and Brezhnev**, as Prime Minister Rudd expressed it last year. **Although contemporary supporters of a ‘Third Way’ claim to be fighting neoliberalism, to Rüstow this very same ‘Third Way’ was neoliberalism**. He called it neoliberalism to differentiate it from earlier liberalism, for which Rüstow frequently used derogatory terms such as ‘vulgar liberalism.’ Rüstow wanted to break with this old liberal tradition to put a new liberalism in its place—hence the prefix ‘neo.**’ It was the philosophy for the state setting and policing a regulatory framework without actually planning the economy.** A group of German economists and lawyers continued to develop this neoliberal philosophy in the 1930s and 1940s. Some of them, like Rüstow himself, left Nazi Germany to work in exile. Others like Walter Eucken, a close friend of Rüstow, remained in Germany where they were under constant threat. The Protestant theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer is well known to an Australian audience since Rudd had named him ‘without doubt, the man I admire most in the history of the twentieth century.’ Therefore it may be of some interest that Bonhoeffer, too, was connected to the German neoliberal movement. It was none other than Bonhoeffer who commissioned the neoliberal economists around Walter Eucken for a concept for both domestic and foreign policies in Germany after the end of National Socialism. When the assassination of Hitler on 20 July 1944 failed, parts of this memorandum were obtained by the Gestapo, and Bonhoeffer was executed for his involvement in these post-war plans. It may seem ironic that Rudd’s most admired man in recent history had sympathies for neoliberalism, when the same Rudd has subsequently denounced neoliberalism as an empty philosophy. **The philosophy of neoliberalism was eventually implemented in West Germany’s ‘Social Market Economy.’ There it became the foundation of the country’s rapid economic growth after the war, the so-called ‘economic miracle**.’ Neoliberalism is a far richer, more thoughtful concept than it is mostly perceived today. To those criticising neoliberalism today, the answer may well be just that: **We need more of this kind of neoliberalism that sets a good framework for a free economy. What we would need less of is only the rhetorical abuse of neoliberalism for political purposes.**

### A2 No LinK

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#### Vagueness means the alt doesn’t solve

Grossberg 92 – Communication Studies Professor, UNC (Lawrence, We Gotta Get Out of This Place, p 388-90)

If it is capitalism that is at stake, our moral opposition to it has to be tempered by the realities of the world and the possibilities of political change. Taking a simple **negative relation to** it, as if the moral condemnation of the evil of **capitalism** were sufficient (granting that it does establish grotesque systems of inequality and oppression), **is not likely to establish a viable political agenda**. First, it is not at all clear what it would mean to overthrow capitalism in the current situation. Unfortunately, despite our desires, "the **masses" are not waiting to be led into revolution**, and it is not simply a case of their failure to recognize their own best interests, as if we did. Are we to decide-rather undemocratically, I might add-to overthrow capitalism in spite of their legitimate desires? Second, as much as capitalism is the cause of many of the major threats facing the world, at the moment it may also be one of the few forces of stability, unity and even, within limits, a certain "civility" in the world. The world system is, unfortunately, simply too precarious and the alternative options not all that promising. Finally, the appeal of an as yet **unarticulated and** even **unimagined future, while perhaps powerful as a moral imperative, is** simply **too weak** in the current context **to effectively organize people, and too vague to provide any direction.**

### Inev

#### **Neolib inevitable: knowledge production**

Dieter Plehwe (Two-time guest prof at Yale. Rsch Fllw @ NYU, Research Fellow, Social Science Research Center Berlin) and Bernhard Walpen (The Forschungs- und Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt (FORBA) is an independent research institute specialising in social-science research on work and employment) *Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique*. “Between network and complex organization: The Making of Neoliberal: Knowledge and Hegemony”. 12/8/2005. http://www.forba.at/data/downloads/file/300-Plehwe-Walpen.pdf

We can thus observe both **a widening and deepening of neoliberal networks of intellectuals** and advocacy think tanks, **a considerable increase in reach and scope** around the globe **as well as specific national and supranational arenas and discourse areas.**21 **Neoliberal knowledge production and dissemination certainly has not declined in the most recent period, rather the opposite: A very solid intellectual force and constitutive part of historical power blocs that defend and maintain neoliberal hegemonic constellations is strongly entrenched in many (civil and political) societies around the globe, capable of working on almost any subject of concern, and able to strategically develop capacities and competencies if needed. Reliable and tested channels of communication can be used to eventually disseminate the result of the work, and the neoliberal networks are capable to rapidly change tactics**.

#### Desire for continued neoliberal growth is innate – poor countries won’t sign onto the alt

Aligica ’03(Paul Aligica, Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, “The Great Transition and the Social Limits to Growth: Herman Kahn on Social Change and Global Economic Development”, April 21, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=2827)

Stopping things would mean if not to engage in an experiment to change the human nature, at least in an equally difficult experiment in altering powerful cultural forces: "We firmly believe that **despite the arguments put forward by people who would like to 'stop the earth and get off,' it is simply impractical to do so. Propensity to change** may not be inherent in human nature, but **it is firmly embedded in most contemporary cultures. People** have **almost everywhere** become curious, future oriented, and dissatisfied with their conditions. They **want more material goods and covet higher status and greater control of nature**. Despite much propaganda to the contrary, they believe in progress and future" (Kahn, 1976, 164). As regarding the critics of growth that stressed the issue of the gap between rich and poor countries and the issue of redistribution, Kahn noted that **what most people everywhere want was visible, rapid improvement in their economic status and living standards, and not a closing of the gap** (Kahn, 1976, 165). **The people from poor countries have as a basic goal the transition from poor to middle class. The other implications of social change are secondary for them.** Thus a crucial factor to be taken into account is that **while the zero-growth advocates and their followers may be satisfied to stop at the present point, most others are not. Any serious attempt to frustrate these expectations or desires of that majority is likely to fail and/or create disastrous counter reactions.** Kahn was convinced that **"any concerted attempt to stop or even slow 'progress' appreciably (**that is, to be satisfied with the moment) **is catastrophe-prone**". **At the minimum, "it would probably require the creation of extraordinarily repressive governments or movements-and probably a repressive international system**" (Kahn, 1976, 165; 1979, 140-153). The pressures of **overpopulation, national security challenges and poverty as well as the revolution of rising expectations could be solved only in a continuing growth environment**. Kahn rejected the idea that continuous growth would generate political repression and absolute poverty. On the contrary, **it is the limits-to-growth position "which creates low morale, destroys assurance, undermines the legitimacy of governments everywhere, erodes personal and group commitment to constructive activities and encourages obstructiveness to reasonable policies and hopes".** Hence **this position "increases enormously the costs of creating the resources needed for expansion, makes more likely misleading debate and misformulation of the issues, and make less likely constructive and creative lives**". Ultimately "**it is precisely this position the one that increases the potential for the kinds of disasters which most at its advocates are trying to avoid**" (Kahn, 1976, 210; 1984).

### Alt Bad

#### The alternative is not non- neolib but distorted versions like China’s- the financial crisis doesn’t doom it

Rogoff 2011 (Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of Economics at Harvard University and recipient of the 2011 Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics, was the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund from 2001 Dec. 2, 2011 Is Modern Capitalism Sustainable? http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/is-modern-capitalism-sustainable-)

CAMBRIDGE – **I am often asked if the** recent global **financial crisis marks the beginning of the end** **of modern capitalism. It is a curious question, because it seems to presume that there is a viable replacement waiting in the wings**. The truth of the matter is that, f**or now at least, the only serious alternatives** to today’s dominant Anglo-American paradigm **are other forms of capitalism**. European capitalism, which combines generous health and social benefits with reasonable working hours, long vacation periods, early retirement, and relatively equal income distributions, would seem to have everything to recommend it – except sustainability. **China’s Darwinian capitalism**, with its fierce competition among export firms, a weak social-safety net, and widespread government intervention, **is widely touted as the inevitable heir** to Western capitalism, if only because of China’s huge size and consistent outsize growth rate. Yet China’s economic system is continually evolving. Indeed, it is far from clear how far China’s political, economic, and financial structures will continue to transform themselves, and whether China will eventually morph into capitalism’s new exemplar. In any case, China is still encumbered by the usual social, economic, and financial vulnerabilities of a rapidly growing lower-income country. Perhaps the real point is that, in the broad sweep of history, **all** current **forms of capitalism are ultimately transitional. Modern-day capitalism has had an extraordinary run since** the start of the Industrial Revolution **two centuries ago, lifting billions** of ordinary people o**ut of abject poverty**. **Marxism and heavy-handed socialism have disastrous records by comparison**. But, as industrialization and technological progress spread to Asia (and now to Africa), **someday** the struggle for **subsistence** **will no longer be a primary imperative, and** contemporary capitalism’s numerous flaws may loom larger. First, even the leading capitalist economies have failed to price public goods such as clean air and water effectively. The failure of efforts to conclude a new global climate-change agreement is symptomatic of the paralysis. Second, along with great wealth, capitalism has produced extraordinary levels of inequality. The growing gap is partly a simple byproduct of innovation and entrepreneurship. People do not complain about Steve Jobs’s success; his contributions are obvious. But this is not always the case: great wealth enables groups and individuals to buy political power and influence, which in turn helps to generate even more wealth. Only a few countries – Sweden, for example – have been able to curtail this vicious circle without causing growth to collapse. A third problem is the provision and distribution of medical care, a market that fails to satisfy several of the basic requirements necessary for the price mechanism to produce economic efficiency, beginning with the difficulty that consumers have in assessing the quality of their treatment. The problem will only get worse: health-care costs as a proportion of income are sure to rise as societies get richer and older, possibly exceeding 30% of GDP within a few decades. In health care, perhaps more than in any other market, many countries are struggling with the moral dilemma of how to maintain incentives to produce and consume efficiently without producing unacceptably large disparities in access to care. It is ironic that modern capitalist societies engage in public campaigns to urge individuals to be more attentive to their health, while fostering an economic ecosystem that seduces many consumers into an extremely unhealthy diet. According to the United States Centers for Disease Control, 34% of Americans are obese. Clearly, conventionally measured economic growth – which implies higher consumption – cannot be an end in itself. Fourth, today’s capitalist systems vastly undervalue the welfare of unborn generations. For most of the era since the Industrial Revolution, this has not mattered, as the continuing boon of technological advance has trumped short-sighted policies. By and large, each generation has found itself significantly better off than the last. But, with the world’s population surging above seven billion, and harbingers of resource constraints becoming ever more apparent, there is no guarantee that this trajectory can be maintained. Financial crises are of course a fifth problem, perhaps the one that has provoked the most soul-searching of late. In the world of finance, continual technological innovation has not conspicuously reduced risks, and might well have magnified them. In principle**, none of capitalism’s problems is insurmountable, and economists have offered a variety of market-based solutions**. A high global price for carbon would induce firms and individuals to internalize the cost of their polluting activities. Tax systems can be designed to provide a greater measure of redistribution of income without necessarily involving crippling distortions, by minimizing non-transparent tax expenditures and keeping marginal rates low. Effective pricing of health care, including the pricing of waiting times, could encourage a better balance between equality and efficiency. Financial systems could be better regulated, with stricter attention to excessive accumulations of debt. Will capitalism be a victim of its own success in producing massive wealth? For now, **as fashionable as the topic of capitalism’s demise might be, the possibility seems remote**. Nevertheless, as pollution, financial instability, health problems, and inequality continue to grow, and as political systems remain paralyzed, capitalism’s future might not seem so secure in a few decades as it seems now.

### Tech

#### **Economic growth is key to transhumanism**

Kurzweil 01 (Ray, Ph.D. and Genius Inventor, “The Law of Accelerating Returns”, Lifeboat Foundation Special Reports, <http://lifeboat.com/ex/law.of.accelerating.returns>)

**There is a vital economic imperative to create** more **intelligent technology**. **Intelligent machines have enormous value. That is why they are being built**. There are tens of thousands of projects that are advancing intelligent machines in diverse incremental ways. The support for "high tech" in the business community (mostly software) has grown enormously. When I started my optical character recognition (OCR) and speech synthesis company ([Kurzweil Computer Products, Inc.](http://www.kurzweiltech.com/kcp.html)) in 1974, there were only a half-dozen high technology IPO's that year. The number of such deals has increased one hundred fold and the number of dollars invested has increased by more than one thousand fold in the past 25 years. In the four years between 1995 and 1999 alone, high tech venture capital deals increased from just over $1 billion to approximately $15 billion. **We will** continue to **build more powerful** computational **mechanisms because it creates enormous value.** **We will reverse-engineer the human brain** not simply because it is our destiny, but because there is valuable information to be found there that will provide insights in building more intelligent (and more valuable) machines. **We would have to repeal capitalism** and every visage of economic competition **to stop this progression**.

#### **We Control Access: This Debate Helps reverse the Failures of humanism: speciesm, racism, and disposability. We control access to root causes.**

Nick Bostrom, Faculty of Philosophy Oxford University, The Transhumanist FAQ- A General Introduction, Version 2.1 (2003), google.

Transhumanism is compatible with a variety of ethical systems, and transhumanists themselves hold many different views. Nonetheless, the following seems to constitute a common core of agreement: According to transhumanists, the human condition has been improved if the conditions of individual humans have been improved. In practice, competent adults are usually the best judges of what is good for themselves. Therefore, transhumanists advocate individual freedom, especially the right for those who so wish to use technology to extend their mental and physical capacities and to improve their control over their own lives. From this perspective, an improvement to the human condition is a change that gives increased opportunity for individuals to shape themselves and their lives according to their informed wishes. Notice the word “ informed” . It is important that people be aware of what they choose between. Education, discussion, public debate, critical thinking, artistic exploration, and, potentially, cognitive enhancers are means that can help people make more informed choices. Transhumanists hold that people are not disposable. Saving lives (of those who want to live) is ethically important. It would be wrong to unnecessarily let existing people die in order to replace them with some new “ better” people. Healthspan-extension and cryonics are therefore high on the transhumanist list of priorities. The transhumanist goal is not to replace existing humans with a new breed of super-beings, but rather to give human beings (those existing today and those who will be born in the future) the option of developing into posthuman persons. The non-disposability of persons partially accounts for a certain sense of urgency that is common among transhumanists. On average, 150,000 men, women, and children die every day, often in miserable conditions. In order to give as many people as possible the chance of a posthuman existence – or even just a decent human existence – it is paramount that technological development, in at least some fields, is pursued with maximal speed. When it comes to life-extension and its various enabling technologies, a delay of a single week equals one million avoidable premature deaths – a weighty fact which those who argue for bans or moratoria would do well to consider carefully. (The further fact that universal access will likely lag initial availability only adds to the reason for trying to hurry things along.) Transhumanists reject speciesism, the (human racist) view that moral status is strongly tied to membership in a particular biological species, in our case homo sapiens. What exactly does determine moral status is a matter of debate. Factors such as being a person, being sentient, having the capacity for autonomous moral choice, or perhaps even being a member of the same community as the evaluator, are among the criteria that may combine to determine the degree of somebody’ s moral status (Warren 1997). But transhumanists argue that species-identity should be de-emphasized in this context. Transhumanists insist that all beings that can experience pain have some moral status, and that posthuman persons could have at least the same level of moral status as humans have in their current form.

#### Capitalism fosters innovation that’s vital to overcoming resource shortages

Smith, 93 (Fred L., Jr., President and Founder of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, The Market and Nature, September, http://cei.org/gencon/019,03108)

The **prophets** of sustainability have consistently **predicted an end to the world’s abundant resources, while the defenders of the free market point to the power of innovation**—innovation which is encouraged in the marketplace. Consider the agricultural experience. Since 1950, improved plant and animal breeds, expanded availability and types of agri-chemicals, innovative agricultural techniques, expanded irrigation, and better pharmaceutical products have all combined to spur a massive expansion of world food supplies. That was not expected by those now championing “sustainable development.” Lester Brown, in his 1974 Malthusian publication By Bread Alone, suggested that crop-yield increases would soon cease. Since that date, Asian rice yields have risen nearly 40 percent, an approximate increase of 2.4 percent per year. This rate is similar to that of wheat and other grains. In the developed world it is food surpluses, not food shortages, that present the greater problem, while political institutions continue to obstruct the distribution of food in much of the Third World. **Man’s greater understanding and ability to work with nature have made it possible to achieve a vast improvement in world food supplies,** to improve greatly the nutritional levels of a majority of people throughout the world in spite of rapid population growth. Moreover, **this has been achieved while reducing the stress to the environment.** To feed the current world population at current nutritional levels using 1950 yields would require plowing under an additional 10 to 11 million square miles, almost tripling the world’s agricultural land demands (now at 5.8 million square miles). This would surely come at the expense of land being used for wildlife habitat and other applications. Moreover, **this improvement** in agriculture has been matched by improvements in food distribution and storage, again **encouraged by natural market processes and the “profit incentive**” that so many environmentalists deplore. Packaging has made it possible to reduce food spoilage, reduce transit damage, extend shelf life, and expand distribution regions. Plastic and other post-use wraps along with the ubiquitous Tupperware have further reduced food waste. As would be expected, the United States uses more packaging than Mexico, but the additional packaging results in tremendous reductions in waste. On average, a Mexican family discards 40 percent more waste each day. Packaging often eliminates more waste than it creates. Despite the fact that capitalism has produced more environment-friendly innovations than any other economic system, the advocates of sustainable development insist that this process must be guided by benevolent government officials. That such efforts, such as the United States’ synthetic fuels project of the late 1970s, have resulted in miserable failures is rarely considered. It is remarkable how many of the participants at the UN Earth Summit seemed completely oblivious to this historical reality. In the free market, entrepreneurs compete in developing low-cost, efficient means to solve contemporary problems. The promise of a potential profit, and the freedom to seek after it, always provides the incentive to build a better mousetrap, if you will. Under planned economies, this incentive for innovation can never be as strong, and the capacity to reallocate resources toward more efficient means of production is always constrained. This confusion is also reflected in the latest environmental fad: waste reduction. With typical ideological fervor, a call for increased efficiency in resource use becomes a call to use less of everything, regardless of the cost. Less, we are told, is more in terms of environmental benefit. But neither recycling nor material or energy use reductions per se are a good thing, even when judged solely on environmental grounds. Recycling paper often results in increased water pollution, increased energy use, and, in the United States, actually discourages the planting of new trees. Mandating increased fuel efficiency for automobiles reduces their size and weight, which in turn reduces their crashworthiness and increases highway fatalities. **Environmental policies must be judged on their results, not just their motivations. Overcoming Scarcity Environmentalists tend to focus on ends rather than processes. This is surprising given their adherence to ecological teaching. Their obsession with the technologies and material-usage patterns of today reflects a failure to understand how the world works.** The resources people need are not chemicals, wood fiber, copper, or the other raw materials of concern to the sustainable-development school. We demand housing, transportation, and communication services. How those demands are met is a derivative result based on competitive forces—forces which respond by suggesting new ways to meet old needs as well as improving the ability to meet needs in older ways. **Consider, for example, the fears expressed in the early post-war era that copper would soon be in short supply.** Copper was the life-blood of the world’s communication system, essential to linking together humanity throughout the world. Extrapolations suggested problems **and copper prices escalated accordingly. The result? New sources of copper** in Africa, South America, and even the United States and Canada, were found. That concern, however, also prompted others to review new technologies, an effort that produced today’s rapidly expanding fiber optics links. Such changes would be viewed as miraculous if not now commonplace in the industrialized, and predominantly capitalistic, nations of the world. Data assembled by Lynn Scarlett of the Reason Foundation noted that a system requiring, say, 1,000 tons of copper can be replaced by as little as 25 kilograms of silicon, the basic component of sand. Moreover, the fiber-optics system has the ability to carry over 1,000 times the information of the older copper wire. Such rapid increases in communication technology are also providing for the displacement of oil as electronic communication reduces the need to travel and commute. **The rising fad of telecommuting was not dreamed up by some utopian environmental planner, but was rather a natural outgrowth of market processes**. It is essential to understand that **physical resources are, in and of themselves, largely irrelevant**. **It is the interaction of man and science that creates resources: Sand and knowledge become fiber optics.** Humanity and its institutions determine whether we eat or die. The increase of political control over physical resources and new technologies only increases the likel

#### Best studies prove trade solves war

Hegre et al 2009 (H’vard Hegre, Professor of Political Science @University of Oslo, , John R. Oneal, Professor of Political Science @ The University of Alabama, Bruce Russett, Professor of Political Science @ Yale University) August 25, 2009 “Trade Does Promote Peace: New Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal Effects of Trade and Conflict” http://www.yale-university.com/leitner/resources/docs/HORJune09.pdf)

Liberals expect economically important trade to reduce conflict because interstate violence adversely affects commerce, prospectively or contemporaneously. Keshk, Reuveny, & Pollins (2004) and Kim & Rousseau (2005) report on the basis of simultaneous analyses of these reciprocal relations that conflict impedes trade but trade does not deter conflict. Using refined measures of geographic proximity and size—the key elements in the gravity model of international interactions—reestablishes support for the liberal peace, however. Without careful specification, trade becomes a proxy for these fundamental exogenous factors, which are also important influences on dyadic conflict. KPR‘s and KR‘s results are spurious. Large, proximate states fight more and trade more. Our re-analyses show that, as liberals would expect, commerce reduces the risk of interstate conflict when proximity and size are properly modeled in both the conflict and trade equations. We provided new simultaneous estimates of liberal theory using Oneal & Russett‘s (2005) data and conflict equation and a trade model derived from Long (2008). These tests confirm the pacific benefit of trade. Trade reduces the likelihood of a fatal militarized dispute, 1950–2000 in our most comprehensive analysis, as it does in the years 1984-97 when additional measures of traders‘ expectations of domestic and interstate conflict are incorporated (Long, 2008) and in the period 1885-2000. This strong support for liberal theory is consistent with Kim‘s (1998) early simultaneous estimates, Oneal, Russett & Berbaum‘s (2003) Granger-style causality tests, and recent research by Robst, Polachek & Chang (2007). Reuveny & Kang (1998) and Reuveny (2001) report mixed results. It is particularly encouraging that, when simultaneously estimated, the coefficient of trade in the conflict equation is larger in absolute value than the corresponding value in a simple probit analysis. Thus, the dozens of published articles that have addressed the endogeneity of trade by controlling for the years of peace—as virtually all have done since 1999—have not overstated the benefit of interdependence. Admittedly, our instrumental variables are not optimal. In some cases, for example, in violation of the identification rule, the creation or end of a PTA may be a casus belli. More importantly, neither of our instruments explains a large amount of variance. Thus, future research should be directed to identifying better instruments. Our confidence in the commercial peace does not depend entirely on the empirical evidence, however; it also rests on the logic of liberal theory. Our new simultaneous estimates—as well as our re-analyses of KPR and KR—indicate that fatal disputes reduce trade. Even with extensive controls for on-going domestic conflict, militarized disputes with third parties, and expert estimates of the risks of such violence, interstate conflict has an adverse contemporaneous effect on bilateral trade. This is hardly surprising (Anderton & Carter, 2001; Reuveny, 2001; Li & Sacko, 2002; Oneal, Russett & Berbaum, 2003; Glick & Taylor, 2005; Kastner, 2007; Long, 2008; Findlay & O‘Rourke, 2007; cf. Barbieri & Levy, 1999; Blomberg & Hess, 2006; and Ward & Hoff, 2007). If conflict did not impede trade, economic agents would be indifferent to risk and the maximization of profit. Because conflict is costly, trade should reduce interstate violence. Otherwise, national leaders would be insensitive to economic loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors. Whether paid prospectively or contemporaneously, the economic cost of conflict should reduce the likelihood of military conflict, ceteris paribus, if national leaders are rational.

### Enviro

#### Capitalism better for the environment

Bhagwati 4– Economics Professor, Columbia (Jagdish, In Defense of Globalization, p 144-5)

The belief that specific pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide, resulting from increased economic activity will rise in urban areas as per capita income increases depends on two assumptions: that all activities expand uniformly and that pollution per unit output in an activity will not diminish. But neither assumption is realistic. As income rises, activities that cause more pollution may contract and those that cause less pollution may expand, so the sulfur dioxide concentration may fall instead of rise. In fact, **as development occurs, economies** typically **shift from primary production**, which is often pollution intensive, to manufactures, which are often less so, and then **to traded services, which are** currently even **less pollution-intensive**. This natural evolution itself could then reduce the pollution-intensity of income as development proceeds. Then again, the available technology used, and technology newly invented, may become more environment-friendly over time. Both phenomena constitute an ongoing, observed process. The shift to environment-friendly technology can occur naturally as households, for example, become less poor and shift away from indoor cooking with smoke-causing coal-based fires to stoves using fuels that cause little smoke. 19 But this shift is often a result also of environment-friendly technological innovation prompted by regulation. Thus, restrictions on allowable fuel efficiency have promoted research by the car firms to produce engines that yield more miles per gallon. But these **regulations are created by increased environmental consciousness**, for **which** the environmental groups can take credit. And the rise of these environmental groups **is**, in turn, **associated with increased incomes.** Also, revelations about **the astonishing environmental degradation in the Soviet Union** and its satellites **underline how the absence of democratic feedback** and controls is a surefire recipe for environmental neglect. The fact that economic growth generally promotes democracy, as discussed in Chapter 8, is yet another way in which rising income creates a better environment. In all these ways, then, increasing incomes can reduce rather than increase pollution. In fact, for several pollutants, empirical studies have found a bell-shaped curve: pollution levels first rise with income but then fall with it. 20 The economists Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, who estimated the levels of different pollutants such as sulfur dioxide in several cities worldwide, were among the first to show this, estimating that for sulfur dioxide levels, the peak occurred in their sample at per capita incomes of $5,000–6,000. 21 Several **historical examples can also be adduced: the reduction in smog** today compared to what the industrial revolution produced in European cities in the nineteenth century, **and** the **reduced deforestation** of United States compared to a century ago.

### A2 Water Wars

#### Water wars are a myth—overwhelming empirical evidence

Weinthal and Vengosh 11—\*Erika Weinthal is Associate Professor of Environmental Policy at the Nicholas School of the Environment at Duke University and \*\*Avner Vengosh is a Professor of Geochemistry and Water Quality and chair of the Water and Air Resources program at the Nicholas School of Environment in Duke University [ed. Richard Parker, Marni Sommer, “Water and Conflict,” ch. 26, *Routledge Handbook of Global Public Health*, Taylor & Francis, Feb 1, 2011]

By the end of the twentieth century, it was thus widely assumed that water scarcity would be a driver of conflict between nation states, especially in the arid regions of MENA. World leaders such as former UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, famously warned, ‘the next war in the Middle East will he fought over water, not politics' (Vesilind 1993: 53). The Economist, furthermore, predicted in 1999 that '[w]ith 3.5 billion people affected by water shortages by 2050, conditions are ripe for a century of water conflicts.’ The empirical evidence, however, has yet to support such prophecies. Rather, when it comes to water resources at the interstate level, cooperation is much more ubiquitous. The historical record shows that states rarely if ever go to war over water; in parsing more than 1,800 state-to-state water interactions in trans-boundary basins between 1946 and 1999, Wolf et al. (2003) demonstrated that none have led to formal war. Yet such encouraging findings should not obscure the fact that the ‘[MENA] region has a striking absence of inclusive and comprehensive international water agreements on its most significant trans-boundary water courses’ (World Bank 2007: 80). The Nile River Basin, which is shared by ten countries and inhabited by approximately 150 million people, for example, has a long history of tension (e.g. Egypt-Sudan conflicts in the l950s). In spite of current progress with the Nile Basin Initiative (World Bank 2007: 83), Egypt—the dominant downstream riparian (i.e. water user along the river)—continues to appropriate more than 90 per cent of the Nile River.¶ With the maturation of the field of water conflict and cooperation, the notion of impending water wars has come to be better understood as a ‘myth’ rather than a ‘reality’ (Bencala and Dabelko 2008). This is not to say that tensions do not exist among states regarding their shared and limited water resources, but rather there is a growing realisation that the source of conflict is emanating from disagreements within a country due to a lethal combination of population growth, unsustainable water withdrawals, lack of adequate water management, weak institutions, and pressure for economic development (e.g. see Wolf 2007). The Pacific Institute's Water Conflict Chronology indicates that between 2000 and 2009, most occurrences of water conflict were at the sub-national level, of which nearly half were development disputes. Examples in 2009 include hundreds of Mumbai residents in India protesting water cuts that resulted in one person being killed and dozens injured, and violent clashes in Ethiopia over access to water in the Somali border region.

# 1NR

### Growth solves social and cultural tensions—gives optimism

William J. Baumol (PhD. Economics NYU), Robert E. Litan (Senior Fellow Economics Brookings Institution), and Carl J. Schramm. (Chief executive officer of the Kauffman Foundation). Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and The Economics of Growth and Prosperity. 2007. p.32-3.

Economic Growth and Domestic Civility Finally, economic growth is like a social lubricant that eases tensions while giving hope to populations. Societies with stagnant or, even worse, declining per capita incomes by definition cannot convince younger people that their economic fortunes will improve as they grow older. And without hope there is little or no entrepreneurial spirit to strive to change the existing order or to improve one's own standard of living, let alone the living standards of neighborhoods, cities, or entire countries. In short, the lack of growth itself can become an obstacle, holding back economic progress, or even worse. As Harvard University economist Ben Friedman has persuasively argued, slow growth, especially when coupled with widening inequality, can provide the environment that breeds distrust and often hate (Friedman, Zoos). It is not an accident, he points out, that some of the worst periods of intolerance toward African Americans and immigrants in post–Civil War United States history,(the late 1800s, the 1930s, 1970s, and early i98os) occurred during periods of slow or negative growth. The worst-case example of this was, of course, the rise of Nazism in Germany following World War I, when that country was mired in both hyperinflation and stagnant growth (and eventually depression). In more recent times—for example, in the last decades of slow growth and high unemployment—Continental Europe has again flirted with anti-Semitism, while hosting a strong strain of anti-immigrant sentiment. The reverse is much more likely to be true for economies that are growing. These have the good fortune to take advantage of a virtuous cycle, since the young can count on a better life, assuming they work hard to achieve it. Visitors to India or China or Ireland or Israel, for example, report a vibrancy and sense of excitement that one doesn't hear about in Western Europe, at the rich end, or much of Latin America or Africa, at the lower end of the world income distribution. Growth opens up opportunities, which in turn unleash not only hope but also the work ethic that helps turn opportunities into reality. Much of this same energy and optimism can be found in pockets of the United States—in high-technology clusters and in parts of some American cities. The challenge will be to maintain this combination of energy and hope in coming decades, when the United States also begins to deal with the many challenges of its retiring baby-boom generation.

## 2NC Limits Good

#### Limits outweigh –

#### A. Most logical—the significance of one-of-many issues is minimal. Constraints inherently increase meaning.

#### B. It’s a precursor—education is inevitable, unfocused education isn’t productive. Limits determine the direction and productivity of learning.

#### Small schools- Huge topic with constantly developing literature magnifies resource disparities- Big programs can have a new aff every other round- No topic generics sufficient to restore balance

#### Key to fairness- essential to ensure that debates at the end of the year have meaningful clash over the mechanism

#### Literally doubles the educational benefit

**Arrington 2009** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic

#### Turns their offense—limits are vital to creativity and innovation

David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

## t

The aff is not a topical restriction on the President’s war powers authority.

They just:

Our interp is the

### The war power authority of the president is activated by Congressional authorization- that’s key to set a limit on what the term means

Bejesky 2013 [Robert Bejesky M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law ¶ (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the ¶ Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, American government and ¶ constitutional law courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University ¶ and the University of Miami. 1/23/2013 “WAR POWERS PURSUANT TO FALSE PERCEPTIONS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN THE “ZONE OF TWILIGHT”” St Mary’s Law Journal http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/Bejesky\_Step12.pdf]

Congressional war powers include the prerogatives to “declare War;” ¶ “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” which were operations that fell ¶ short of “war”; “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the ¶ land and naval Forces;” “to provide for organizing, arming, and ¶ disciplining, the Militia;” “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and ¶ Water;” “raise and support Armies;” and “provide and maintain a ¶ Navy.”¶ 46¶ Alternatively, the President is endowed with one war power, ¶ that of “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.”¶ 47¶ Numerical ¶ comparison indicates that the intended dominant branch in war powers ¶ decisions is Congress. The Commander in Chief authority is a core preclusive power that ¶ designates the President as the head of the military command chain once ¶ Congress activates the power.¶ 48¶ Moreover, peripheral Commander in ¶ Chief powers are bridled by both statutory and treaty restrictions.¶ 49¶ The ¶ media lore of using “Commander in Chief” coterminous with “President” ¶ might occasionally be a misnomer outside of war, perhaps abetting ¶ presidential expansionism when combined with commentators employing ¶ terms such as “inherent authority.” Clearly, if Congress has not activated ¶ war powers, the President still possesses inherent authority to react ¶ expeditiously and unilaterally to defend the nation when confronted with ¶ imminent peril.¶ 50¶ However, the Framers drew a precise distinction when ¶ they specifically empowered the President “to repel and not to commence ¶ war.”¶ 51¶ Alexander Hamilton explained that latitude was required “because ¶ it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national ¶ exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which ¶ may be necessary to satisfy them.”¶ 52

### They’re a limit on the president’s ongoing conflict, not his war powers authority

### Prefer this interp based on limits- presidents assert they have the authority to do almost anything- they have huge institutional incentives to continue that trend- the negative cannot be expected to have a case neg to every assertion the OLC has ever made about what authority the president has

### Statutes limit presidential authority

Neil Kinkopf, Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law, 2005, “The Statutory Commander in Chief,” Indiana Law Journal, Fall, pp. LN.

This symposium asks us to consider the scope and limits of presidential power in the context of war and terrorism. This question strongly suggests a constitutional focus. [n1](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1365110483507&returnToKey=20_T17087561416&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.113675.46701765596#n1) Because the Constitution establishes the presidential office and sets forth its powers and duties, it is the appropriate starting point for considering this question. The Constitution alone, however, does not get us very far. A wide range of statutes bear on the President's power in this realm and serve to define the extent and limits of his power. As a practical matter, then, the question of presidential power in the context of war and terrorism is one of statutory interpretation. Recognizing the centrality of statutory interpretation in this crucial area, a number of scholars have turned their attention to this question. From their writings, a consensus appears to be emerging on some important foundational points. First, these scholars claim that the President is entitled to deference. Second, where assertions of presidential power implicate individual constitutional rights, these scholars claim that the President's assertion must be founded on a statute that includes a clear statement of authority.

### “Judicial restrictions” is a limiting interpretation of executive war powers

Singer 7 (Jana, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, SYMPOSIUM A HAMDAN QUARTET: FOUR ESSAYS ON ASPECTS OF HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: HAMDAN AS AN ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL POWER, Maryland Law Review 2007 66 Md. L. Rev. 759)

n25. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance of courts "to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs"); see also Katyal, supra note 1, at 84 (noting that "in war powers cases, the passive virtues operate at their height to defer adjudication, sometimes even indefinitely"); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255, 1313-17 (1988) (discussing the Court's use of justiciability doctrines to refuse to hear challenges to the President's authority in cases involving foreign affairs); Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court's Noninterference with the Guardians of National Security, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1122, 1124-38 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's general policy of nonintervention in cases concerning actions of governmental agencies and political entities in national security matters); Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the Reagan Era, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 433-34 (1989) (discussing the use of the political question doctrine as a means to avoid judicial restrictions on presidential power in cases involving military force).

### They are effectively a self-restraint, not an external statutory or judicial restriction

### Bidirectionality- allowing self-restraint affs allows actual increases in executive action in topical areas-steals a key neg generic CP—not a decrease in his war powers authority, can easily defend an increase as a result--it’s just NOT the topic

### A limited topic of discussion is key to equitable ground—even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable—this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### They’ll say limits are bad, but constraints are more conducive to creative thinking—following the rules is key to innovation.

Gibbert et al. 7 — Michael Gibbert, Assistant Professor of Management at Bocconi University (Italy), et al., with Martin Hoeglis, Professor of Leadership and Human Resource Management at WHU—Otto Beisheim School of Management (Germany), and Lifsa Valikangas, Professor of Innovation Management at the Helsinki School of Economics (Finland) and Director of the Woodside Institute, 2007 (“In Praise of Resource Constraints,” *MIT Sloan Management Review*, Spring, Available Online at https://umdrive.memphis.edu/gdeitz/public/The%20Moneyball%20Hypothesis/Gibbert%20et%20al.%20-%20SMR%20(2007)%20Praise%20Resource%20Constraints.pdf, Accessed 04-08-2012, p. 15-16)

Resource constraints can also fuel innovative team performance directly. In the spirit of the proverb "necessity is the mother of invention," [end page 15] teams may produce better results because of resource constraints. Cognitive psychology provides experimental support for the "less is more" hypothesis. For example, scholars in creative cognition find in laboratory tests that subjects are most innovative when given fewer rather than more resources for solving a problem.¶ The reason seems to be that the human mind is most productive when restricted. Limited—or better focused—by specific rules and constraints, we are more likely to recognize an unexpected idea. Suppose, for example, that we need to put dinner on the table for unexpected guests arriving later that day. The main constraints here are the ingredients available and how much time is left. One way to solve this problem is to think of a familiar recipe and then head off to the supermarket for the extra ingredients. Alternatively, we may start by looking in the refrigerator and cupboard to see what is already there, then allowing ourselves to devise innovative ways of combining subsets of these ingredients. Many cooks attest that the latter option, while riskier, often leads to more creative and better appreciated dinners. In fact, it is the option invariably preferred by professional chefs.¶ The heightened innovativeness of such "constraints-driven" solutions comes from team members' tendencies, under the circumstances, to look for alternatives beyond "how things are normally done," write C. Page Moreau and Darren W. Dahl in a 2005 Journal of Consumer Research article. Would-be innovators facing constraints are more likely to find creative analogies and combinations that would otherwise be hidden under a glut of resources.

#### You as a judge are responsible for intervening with your ballot—rules create the conditions of possibility for a game to exist—your ballot should go to whatever interpretation makes the game best.

Carter 8 [Leif A, Professor, The Colorado College, “Law and Politics as play,” Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol 83:3, http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf]

Precision of rules and unquestioned authority of judges: Substantive legal rules can seem notoriously ambiguous when compared to the codified rules of organized sports, but this is misleading.144 By the principle that “you can’t play the game without agreeing on the rules,” Roberts’ Rules of Order and the sometimes arcane accumulation of rules of procedure in legislative chambers precisely structure legislative tactics and debate just as The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation structures formal written legal advocacy and the rules of evidence and procedure govern formal litigation. More significantly, political and social play, like organized sports, requires regulatory and judicial independence from the “democratic game” itself. Fareed Zakaria recently reviewed for a general audience the horror sto-ries—the election of Hitler, for example—produced by popular democracy and suggests that other dynamics, and particularly “the rule of law,” con-tribute more to progressive government than does popular democracy it-self.145 Just as umpires, referees, and rules committees act outside competitive play, so a good political game depends on popular trust in the impartiality of judicial and regulatory decision making. The Federal Re-serve Board, the independent regulatory commissions, and ideally the judi-ciary itself, play the critical role of political and economic rules committees effectively only if they do not operate democratically but rather off the playing field altogether. Indeed, given the indeterminacy of substantive principles of morality and justice, rules committees—a category that in- cludes courts of law in common law legal systems—can only be said to act sensibly when they rule (using the good-game criteria noted above) so as to make the game a better game, and not by “seeking justice.” Good political games, hence, require something like the wrongly ma-ligned practice of “judicial activism,” where judges, like calls of umpires and referees, make the rules of the game clear in the moment of play. South Dakotan voters presumably sensed the importance of independent judicial authority when they rejected, by a ratio of nearly nine to one, the proposal on their 2006 ballots to allow a person to sue judges for rendering decisions that he or she didn’t like.146 When the United States Supreme Court issued its deeply flawed result in Bush v. Gore,147 the loser, Gore, and most Americans, accepted the result and moved on.148 The Bush administra-tion’s attempt to justify a “unitary executive” power to operate independent of legal checks from the other political branches is the equivalent of a bat-ter insisting that he, having the power to define the strike zone and dis-agreeing with the umpire’s called third strike on a 3–2 count, trots to first base. The administration’s unitary executive claim, and its patterned disre-gard of legality more generally, ignores an unbroken line of precedents balancing Article I’s legislative powers with those of the executive in Arti-cle II going back to 1804.149 Independence and impartiality of judges: In 2007, Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf ousted Pakistani Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muham-mad Chaudhry because he opposed Musharraf’s unconstitutional attempt to retain his position both as president and supreme military commander. Musharraf subsequently suspended the entire constitution and declared martial law across Pakistan. The public outcry against this violation of the principle of judicial independence forced Musharraf to resign his military command.150 Musharraf erred by ignoring the proven peacemaking tech- nique known as “triadic dispute resolution.” People routinely turn to trusted and independent third parties—mediators, arbitrators, and judges—to re-solve disputes. The dynamic keeps the peace, but only if the third party in the triad avoids appearing to favor one side. “To the extent that the triadic figure appears to intervene in favour of one of the two disputants and against the other, the perception of the situation will shift from the fairest to the most unfair of configurations: two against one.”151 Again, the incoher-ence of criticisms of “judicial activism” becomes clear when viewed in terms of games. Faced with ambiguous law, the judge should ask, “What ruling will make the game better?” There is ample evidence from the auto-biographies of umpires that they routinely think of their rulings in just this way.152 Most developed legal systems train their judges. Indeed, sports umpires and referees compete with each other to rise in their fields through training and experience.153 It makes no more sense to elect judges, as many U.S. jurisdictions do, than it would to have leagues and teams vote on the kind of game officials they want. In American football, imagine the “Pass-ing Party” putting up its slate of referees to run against the candidates slated by “Running Party.”

#### They’ll say that our argument is exclusionary, but they have excluded us from the debate—basic fairness is a reason to vote negative.

Galloway 7 — Ryan Galloway, Assistant Professor and Director of Debate at Samford University, 2007 (“Dinner and Conversation at the Argumentative Table: Re-Conceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue,” *Contemporary Argumentation & Debate*, Volume 28, September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier, p. 12)

While affirmative teams often accuse the negative of using a juridical rule to exclude them, the affirmative also relies upon an unstated rule to exclude the negative response. This unstated but understood rule is that the negative speech act must serve to negate the affirmative act. Thus, affirmative teams often exclude an entire range of negative arguments, including arguments designed to challenge the hegemony, domination, and oppression inherent in topical approaches to the resolution. Becoming more than just a ritualistic tag-line of “fairness, education, time skew, voting issue,” fairness exists in the implicit right to be heard in a meaningful way. Ground is just that—a ground to stand on, a ground to speak from, a ground by which to meaningfully contribute to an ongoing conversation.

#### Executive authority is derivative from Congressional delegation

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(Allan, "Congress, Constitutional Responsibility, and the War Power," *Loyola of LA Law Review*, v. 17, pp. 605)

In short, Congress' power to make war would be treated no differently in terms of lines of authority than Congress' power to regulate commerce among the states. **Congress would have the primary responsibility for determining when and how the war power would be exercised**. **The ability of the executive branch to exercise its constitutional authority over this power would derive from action taken by Congress**. In the absence of congressional action, the executive authority would lie dormant. Of course, **Congress would be required to respect the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch in the prosecution of a national war policy; and, the judiciary would play constitutional referee to the extent that one branch undermined the other's constitutional authority**. However, unquestionably, Congress would be the predominant branch with respect to the nation's power to make war. Under this model, applying Youngstown, if Congress refused to authorize our entry into a war or some lesser military skirmish, the President could not override that decision regardless of the perceived necessity. **Executive authority could be exercised only pursuant to congressional authorization**. Such **a framework of war power authority** may be objected to for its failure to account for the complexity and urgency of the national defense. Certainly, the nation's need to defend itself against sudden attack or imminent security risks cannot be held hostage to a structure that effectively disarms the nation in emergency situations. In an age of terrorism, world wide aggression and nuclear threat, a world power such as the United States must have the flexibility to protect its vital interests. Only the executive branch with its relative efficiency can effectively shoulder this responsibility. To place such responsibility in a deliberative body, separated into two houses, would be tantamount to disarming the nation. In this narrow sphere of activity efficiency and effectiveness must take precedence over principles of representative democracy. To conclude otherwise, would place our constitutional system at the mercy of foreign powers insensitive to the fine tunings of our Constitution.

**Limited to Self Defense absent explicit declaration or legislation**

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Georgetown Law Journal December, 1989 78 Geo. L.J. 415 LENGTH: 13829 words NOTE: Self Defense or Presidential Pretext? The Constitutionality of Unilateral Preemptive Military Action. NAME: Mark J. Yost

This note explores the limits of the President's war powers authority. Specifically, it analyzes whether the President, consistent with his constitutional grant of war powers, can order preemptive military action without congressional consultation. The preemptive air strike that President Reagan planned, but did not order, against the chemical weapons factory at Rabta, Libya provides the context for this discussion. Part I outlines the history of United States-Libyan relations and tracks the construction of the chemical weapons plant at Rabta. Part II discusses the various types of war that may [\*417] be waged under the Constitution. It argues that the Constitution provides for only three types of warmaking: (1) acts of war pursuant to a congressional declaration of war, 10 (2) acts of war authorized by statute, 11 and (3) acts of war pursuant to the President's self-defense power under the commander in chief clause and the executive power clause of article II. This Part then analyzes the factual circumstances attending the Rabta chemical weapons factory and concludes that because there was no congressional declaration of war and because no legislation authorized a preemptive military strike, the President constitutionally could have ordered a strike only under his self-defense power. It concludes by tracing the development of this presidential authority and analyzing the factors that have determined its scope.

### 2NC Reasonability

#### Reasonability begs the question of which interpretation is more correct - if we win a link to precision or limits it outweighs

#### It’s subjective—the difference is impossible to quantify—debate should emphasize 2 competing claims—that encourages debate—best for education.

#### Judge intervention may be inevitable – but offense/defense is key to prevent the worst and most arbitrary form

#### Explodes limits—dozens of exceptions to our interpretation can be made to explode the topic.

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

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(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.